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POWERFUL PARTICULARS: THE REAL REASON
THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES THREATEN
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
ANDERS KAYE*
ABSTRACT
The concept “criminal responsibility” plays an important role in Anglo-American
criminal law. It is central to our excuse doctrines and provides a foundation for our
punishment practices. Nevertheless, legal theorists and philosophers have sometimes argued
that it is not appropriate to treat human wrongdoers as responsible actors. An important
line of such challenges has been grounded in the behavioral sciences. Inspired by startling
findings in psychology, sociology, criminology, neuropsychology, and other behavioral
sciences, some theorists and philosophers have argued that these sciences show (or at least
imply) that human acts are determined acts, that we therefore do not have free will, and
that it is therefore wrong to hold us responsible for what we do.
While this behavioral science challenge could have radical implications for the criminal
law, several influential criminal theorists have offered forceful arguments to rebut it. In
doing so, they have drawn on the philosophical debates about free will, determinism, and
moral responsibility. In particular, they have advocated the philosophical position known as
compatibilism, according to which determinism does not destroy individual responsibility.
If compatibilism is correct, they argue, then determinism is not antithetical to responsibility,
and we therefore need not worry about the implications of determinism we find in the
behavioral sciences.
In this Article, I suggest that this compatibilist argument is inadequate. In fact, it fails
to engage the most potent features of the behavioral science challenge. The real power of the
behavioral science challenge, I will argue, is not that it suggests that determinism is true;
rather, it is that the behavioral sciences bring determinism to life.
This is an important difference. We almost always conceptualize determinism in a
highly abstract way: “everything that happens is destined to happen,” we say. “Everything
has a cause.” The behavioral sciences, however, encourage us to imagine determinism in a
new way. They provide us with concrete, vivid, and particular details about the ways in
which human acts are actually caused. Reflecting upon these details enables us to shift from
an abstract conception of determinism to a particularistic conception of caused human
action. This particularistic conception, I will show, engages our emotions in a much deeper
way than its abstract counterpart and induces a more careful consideration of the
ramifications of determinism for our lives and acts. This, in turn, shifts our moral
intuitions about determinism and responsibility and makes us more likely to see the
behavioral science threat as a real and potent one.
If this is right, the compatibilist argument fails to engage the most potent features of the
behavioral science challenge to criminal responsibility. The compatibilist argument is
tailored to defuse anxieties about determinism understood in the abstract; but the
behavioral sciences give us a taste of determinism in particular detail, and this
particularistic determinism poses a much more serious challenge to the conventional view of
criminal responsibility. This does not mean that criminal responsibility cannot be salvaged;
but it does show that defenders of criminal responsibility have not yet met the full force of
the behavioral science challenge.
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II. THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE CHALLENGE TO CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY:
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I. INTRODUCTION
The behavioral sciences1 are always discovering new things about
human beings, and criminal law scholars often wonder whether these
discoveries have ramifications for the criminal law. One persistent
question is whether these discoveries undercut criminal responsibility. As we read Freud and Skinner, study criminal genes and criminogenic environments, ponder the strange neurologies of violent minds
and preconscious intentions, and discover the perplexing puppetry of
social and situationist psychology, it comes to seem as though much
of what the human actor does is driven by forces beyond his control.
If so, can we really hold the criminal responsible for his crime? The
question taps into classic debates about determinism, free will, and
moral responsibility. On one common view, it is wrong to hold a person responsible if she did not act with free will. The behavioral
sciences seem to suggest that human acts are not really free. Is it
therefore wrong to hold criminal actors responsible?
This line of thought could have radical ramifications for criminal
law, and especially for contemporary punishment practices. Responsibility plays an important role in punishment. For many people,
even the basic inclination or desire to punish a wrongdoer depends
upon the judgment that she is responsible for the wrong. And many
people feel that punishment is not just unless the punished person is
responsible for her act. As a result, doubts about whether a wrongdoer is responsible can shake both the motivation and the justifica1. In this Article, I use the term “behavioral science” broadly, encompassing not only
the traditional behavioral sciences (including, for example, psychology, psychiatry, and
neuropsychology), but, in addition, various social sciences that have been influential in
analysis of criminal conduct (including, for example, sociology and criminology).
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tion for punishing her. In this sense, the questions the behavioral
sciences raise about responsibility also threaten to call into question
contemporary punishment practices.
While anxieties like these arise periodically in criminal theory,
criminal theorists have developed a number of moves for fending off
this challenge from the behavioral sciences. One influential move
draws on compatibilism, a concept developed by philosophers of free
will and moral responsibility, to attack the challenge at its roots.
Proponents of this “compatibilist move” contend that human actors
can be responsible for their acts even if those acts are determined. If
this is right, intimations of determinism in the behavioral sciences
pose no threat to responsibility, for determinism and responsibility
are compatible. This compatibilist move has been influential in criminal theory—so influential that some compatibilist theorists now jovially characterize behavioral science challenges to criminal responsibility as pathological delusions.2
Though it would be comforting if the compatibilist move could
save responsibility from the behavioral science challenge, the challenge is not so easily put down. On the contrary, the proponents of
the compatibilist move have not yet fully appreciated the nature of
the behavioral science challenge. In this Article, I hope to show how
this is so. I will highlight features of the behavioral science challenge
that criminal theorists have so far failed to engage and show how the
compatibilist move fails to meet those features. In so doing, I aim to
move criminal theory regarding responsibility and the behavioral
sciences out of its current rut and catalyze fuller engagement with
the behavioral science challenge to criminal responsibility.
The argument begins with a brief summary of the traditional arguments for and against the behavioral science challenge to criminal
responsibility. The first section of Part II sets out the standard argument in support of that challenge, which might be called the “determinism argument.” As I will explain, this argument takes the behavioral sciences to suggest that human conduct is determined,
maintains that human beings are not morally responsible for determined acts, and concludes that it is therefore wrong to hold criminal
actors responsible for their criminal acts. The second section of Part
II briefly describes the most powerful of the traditional moves for re2. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 379 (2005) (“This brief diagnostic note
identifies a cognitive pathology, ‘Brain Overclaim Syndrome [BOS],’ that often afflicts
those inflamed by the fascinating new discoveries in the neurosciences.”). For a similarly
cheerful dismissal of deterministic challenges to responsibility generally, see Peter Westen,
Getting the Fly Out of the Bottle: The False Problem of Free Will and Determinism, 8 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 599, 601-02, 652 (2005) (suggesting that concern about responsibility in a determined universe is nonsensical and that the best way to deal with such concern is to
“stop thinking about it”).
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futing this deterministic challenge, one that defuses the challenge by
adopting the philosophical position known as compatibilism. The
compatibilist thesis is a reputable and sophisticated one, and criminal theorists versed in the philosophy of responsibility have generally
been content to rest on this “compatibilist move” to dispatch the determinist challenge from the behavioral sciences.
Against the backdrop of this traditional point and counterpoint,
Part III moves to the crux of the argument, showing that the compatibilist move is not sufficient to defuse the determinist challenge from
the behavioral sciences. In fact, the compatibilist move fails to engage the most potent features of this challenge. The real power of the
behavioral science challenge, I will argue, is not that it suggests that
determinism is true; rather, it is that the behavioral sciences bring
determinism to life. This is an important difference. We almost always conceptualize determinism in a highly abstract way: “Everything that happens is destined to happen,” we say. “Everything has a
cause.” The behavioral sciences, however, encourage us to imagine
determinism in a new way. They provide us with concrete, vivid, and
particular details about the ways in which human acts are actually
caused. Reflecting upon these details enables us to shift from an abstract conception of determinism to a particularistic conception of
caused human action. This particularistic conception, I will show, engages our emotions in a much deeper way than its abstract counterpart and induces a more careful consideration of the ramifications of
determinism for our lives and acts. This in turn significantly shifts
our moral intuitions about the significance of determinism for moral
responsibility and makes us far more likely to see the behavioral
science threat as a real and potent one. Live determinism strikes us
more deeply than theoretical determinism.
If this is right, the compatibilist move fails to engage the most potent features of the behavioral science challenge to criminal responsibility. The compatibilist move is tailored to defuse anxieties about
determinism understood in the abstract; but the behavioral sciences
give us a taste of determinism in particular detail, and this particularistic determinism poses a much more serious challenge for moral
intuitions about responsibility. Defenders of criminal responsibility—
and the punishment practices that depend upon it—still have more
work to do.
II. THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE CHALLENGE TO CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY: TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
Since the early twentieth century, the behavioral sciences have
generated a steady stream of new insights and discoveries regarding
the sources and causes of human conduct. Some of these insights and
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discoveries have changed the way we live our lives. They have influenced how we treat mental illness and depression, educate our children, market our products, and regulate our markets and workplaces.
At the same time, they have supplied us with a new vocabulary for
discussing human experiences and human needs, one we use in every
arena from literature to politics. It is not surprising, then, that criminal law scholars sometimes wonder if such insights and discoveries
have ramifications for criminal law—for our crime prevention strategies, law enforcement methods, and punishment practices, or for the
substantive content of criminal law itself.
One especially pressing concern for criminal law scholars is that
these insights and discoveries may threaten criminal responsibility.
This Part offers a brief overview of the traditional arguments for and
against this behavioral science challenge. It begins by describing the
most common formulation of the challenge, one that is rooted in ancient anxieties about determinism. It then sets out the most successful of the traditional counterarguments, which is grounded in the
philosophical doctrine known as compatibilism.
A. The Traditional Argument for the Behavioral Science Challenge:
The Determinism Argument
In the traditional behavioral science challenge to responsibility,
the behavioral sciences are conceived in a broad sense rather than a
precise or technical one. The term is used to encompass conventional
disciplines in the sciences concerned with explaining human behavior, including, but not limited to, psychology (in its various forms),3
sociology, criminology, and certain lines of research in biology, physiology, and neurology. Criminal theorists have been interested in
these various sciences for several decades and attracted to different
lines of theory and research at different times. As Freudian psychoanalytic theory entered the popular consciousness, it drew the attention of scholars across several different disciplines, including philosophy and criminal theory.4 The same thing happened with Skinnerian
behaviorist psychology,5 influential theories in the sociology of crime
(especially those positing relationships between crime and social, political, and economic conditions),6 more recent discoveries in the neu3. Here we might talk about, for example, several sorts of research into mental function, behavior, personality development, psychodynamic psychology, behavioral psychology,
cognitive psychology, social cognition, situationist psychology, and neuropsychology,
among others.
4. See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World, 2005 U. ILL.
L. REV. 601 (2005) (exploring the influence of psychoanalytic theory on criminal theorists
and lawmakers in the early to mid twentieth century).
5. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 162-64 (Rev. ed. 1969).
6. See e.g., Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal Law
Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9 (1985).
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rologies of intention and violence,7 and several strands of recent empirical psychology (including cognitive psychology, social cognition,
and situationist psychology).8
As criminal theorists have engaged these different lines of research and theory, they have sometimes worried that the behavioral
sciences may call into question criminal responsibility.9 Broadly
speaking, they have been concerned that the behavioral sciences may
show that we cannot be morally responsible for our acts. Since many
criminal theorists hold that moral responsibility is a prerequisite for
criminal responsibility10, this would mean (for them) that actors cannot be criminally responsible either.
Of course, this reasoning depends on the idea that the behavioral
sciences call moral responsibility into question. Academic philosophers have suggested several different ways in which this might be
true,11 but the discussion among criminal law theorists has focused
primarily on one sort of argument—an argument grounded in determinism. According to this argument, behavioral science findings
seem to show that human acts are determined, that forces and circumstances beyond our control cause us to do what we do much more
pervasively than we realize. The Freudian theorist maintains, for example, that our acts “are but facades for the expression of uncons-

7. See e.g., Andrew E. Lelling, Comment, Eliminative Materialism, Neuroscience and
the Criminal Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1471, 1520-26 (1993) (discussing possible significance
of Dr. Benjamin Libet’s research into cerebral processes for criminal law).
8. See e.g., JOHN M. DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER (2005); Anders Kaye, Does Situationist Psychology Have Radical Implications for Criminal Responsibility?, 59 ALA. L. REV.
611 (2008).
9. For recent examples of criminal law commentators flagging this concern (some
approvingly, some disapprovingly), see, e.g., Steven K. Erickson, Blaming the Brain, 11
MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 27, 30 (2010); Henry Greely, Law and the Revolution in Neuroscience: An Early Look at the Field, 42 AKRON L. REV. 687, 699 (2009); Stephen O’Hanlon,
Towards a More Reasonable Approach to Free Will in Criminal Law, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 395, 404-11, 420, 425-26 (2009); Peggy Sasso, Criminal Responsibility in
the Age of Mind Reading, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (2009) (“To what extent does
our criminal justice system rest on an assumption that the healthy adult has free will, and
do recent advances in the neurosciences undermine our conception of free will in
relevant ways?”).
10. Stephen Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV.
363, 430 (2004) (“If so, ascribing moral responsibility may be unjustified, and criminal responsibility might also be in doubt for those who believe, as virtually all do, that genuine
moral desert is at least a necessary precondition for criminal blame and punishment.”).
11. Other sorts of challenges might put aside the issue of determinism and focus instead on whether the behavioral sciences show that human actors lack specific features or
capacities necessary for moral responsibility. For example, schematic psychology might be
read to show that human beings are unexpectedly deficient in sensitivity to morally significant facts. See Anders Kaye, Schematic Psychology and Criminal Responsibility, 84 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). Situationist psychology might suggest that human beings’ character traits or desires are not sufficiently coherent to support responsibility. See
Kaye, Situationist Psychology, supra note 8, at 612-14.
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cious wishes, or, rather, unconscious compromises and defenses.”12
The sociologist and the criminologist purport to show that hard socioeconomic conditions inculcate control-destroying rage and powerful antisocial desires that drive antisocial acts.13 The neurologist,
having discovered a striking correlation between childhood head injury and adult criminal behavior, posits that much of the most serious crime results from injuries that disable our prefrontal cortex,
leaving our reflective thought processes unable to intervene effectively against the impulses of the uninhibited limbic system.14 Situationist psychology shows how passing and prosaic situational phenomena
induce us to do things we do not approve of for reasons we do not understand.15 Schematic psychology suggests that environmental and
cultural phenomena bequeath us perceptual and interpretive scanning protocols that can channel us into choices and acts without our
realizing it.16 Each line of research feeds the suspicion that seemingly
spontaneous human actions are actually driven by gears and levers
that can be discovered, described, and manipulated. In the place
where we would hope to find something like a gloriously unconstrained soul, we instead bang our knuckles on pistons and radiator
caps. In this way, behavioral science research begins to look like an
ever-expanding catalogue of causal explanations for what we do and
raises the possibility that we do what we do because of forces and circumstances beyond our control. In short, it suggests that our acts
are determined.

12. John Hospers, Free Will and Psychoanalysis, in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY
463, 466 (Herbert Morris ed., 1961) [hereinafter Hospers, Psychoanalysis]. Hospers elaborated on this central claim in a variety of ways. See John Hospers, What Means this Freedom?, in FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM 31 (Bernard Berofsky ed., 1966) (stating that commands from the unconscious are “exactly like the action of a powerful external force; [they
are] just as little within [our] conscious control”) [hereinafter Hospers, Freedom]; id. at 27
(“Countless criminal acts are thought out in great detail; yet the participants are (without
their own knowledge) acting out fantasies, fears, and defenses from early childhood, over
whose coming and going they have no conscious control.”); Hospers, Psychoanalysis at
471(“[T]he domination of the conscious by the unconscious extended, not merely to a few
exceptional individuals, but to all human beings. . . . the unconscious is the master of every
fate and the captain of every soul.”).
13. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 6 (summarizing a vast body of relevant research in a
well-known article on the rotten social background defense).
14. See, e.g., DOROTHY O. LEWIS, GUILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY: A PSYCHIATRIST
EXPLORES THE MINDS OF KILLERS (1998) (applying this thesis and several other related
ones to case studies of very violent criminals).
15. See, e.g., LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION:
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1991) (providing a seminal summary of situationist
psychology); DORIS, supra note 8 (discussing implications of situationist psychology for virtue ethics and various conceptions of responsibility); Kaye, Situationist Psychology, supra
note 8, at 613, 639-77 (discussing situationism’s ramifications for criminal responsibility).
16. The term schematic psychology encompasses several strands in social cognition.
For a fuller discussion, see Kaye, Schematic Psychology, supra note 11.
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It is true, of course, that nothing in the behavioral sciences is sufficient to establish the truth of determinism outright.17 Behavioral
science findings do not come close to mapping a complete universe of
causal explanations for human acts, and nothing in the research—
standing on its own—makes it obvious that such a map is inevitable.
But we might naturally take the growing body of behavioral science
findings to make an important contribution to the case for determinism in human action. Our lives are full of causal stories about the
events that make up our days. Perhaps the behavioral sciences, hinting at still more causal accounts, supply the straw that breaks the
camel’s back, moving us from doubting determinism to accepting it.18
More pointedly, the behavioral sciences speak to an area where it is
notoriously hard to show causation—the domain of human acts—
making inroads in an area of especially stubborn ambivalence about
determinism. Even here, the behavioral sciences seem to tell us, the
machinery of causation is everywhere to be found. Thus, while nothing in the behavioral sciences “proves” the truth of determinism, behavioral science findings may nevertheless contribute to the case
for determinism.
If this is right, it raises an age-old question: can we be morally responsible for our own acts if those acts are determined? The question
comes naturally from the common and (for many people) powerful intuition that responsibility requires “true,” “contra-causal,” “metaphysical,” free will; that it is wrong to blame a person for an act
caused by forces and circumstances beyond his control.19 Holding actors responsible for such acts seems to turn responsibility into a perverse lottery, one in which phenomena beyond the actor’s control determine whether he will be blamed and punished.20 And it indulges in
a kind of moral tunnel vision, artificially isolating the wrongdoer
from the vast web of things and events that contribute to his act.
Many people have the intuition that this would be morally disturbing.21 Thus, to the extent that the behavioral sciences suggest that
our acts are determined by forces and circumstances beyond our control—that we do not have “true” free will—the behavioral sciences
raise the possibility that it is wrong to treat us as responsible for our
criminal acts.
On this line of reasoning, the behavioral sciences threaten criminal responsibility. Although the behavioral sciences do not conclu17. See Dana K. Nelkin, Freedom, Responsibility and the Challenge of Situationism,
29 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 181, 193 (2005).
18. See id. at 194.
19. See, e.g., Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREE WILL 72 (Gary Watson ed., 2d ed. 2003) (describing and rejecting this view).
20. For fuller discussion of these “tunnel vision” and “lottery” arguments, see Kaye,
Schematic Psychology, supra note 11.
21. Part III, infra, fleshes out one variant of this intuition in more detail.
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sively show that human acts are determined, they give us all sorts of
reasons to worry that determinism is true. If determinism is true, it
may be wrong to hold human actors morally responsible for their
acts. And if it is wrong to hold human actors morally responsible for
their acts, then (on a common view) it is wrong to hold them criminally responsible. Thus, raising the possibility of determinism in human action, the behavioral sciences threaten to cast moral doubt on
attributions of criminal responsibility. This is the traditional argument for the threat from the behavioral sciences.
B. The Traditional Argument Against the Behavioral Science
Challenge: The Compatibilist Move
At first glance, then, the behavioral science challenge to responsibility may appear to present serious problems for important aspects
of our criminal law. It calls into question a cornerstone concept—
criminal responsibility—and casts doubt on the blaming and punishing practices that depend upon that concept. In fact, however, criminal law scholars have persistently fended off this challenge. Indeed,
they have knocked it down so effectively that it has rarely gotten
more than a toehold in criminal theory.
In doing so, these scholars have made various sorts of moves.22 For
example, one crude but common move is to declare that the criminal
law should or must assume that human actors have “true” free will,
notwithstanding any evidence to the contrary. Along these lines,
Herbert Packer famously declared that “the law treats man’s conduct
as autonomous and willed, not because it is, but because it is desirable to proceed as if it were.”23 Another approach engages the prob22. A taxonomy of the possible “moves” here might include several kinds of arguments
against the behavioral science determinist challenge, including the following: arguments
against the claim that the behavioral sciences suggest determinism is true; arguments
against the claim that determinism is inconsistent with moral responsibility (discussed below); arguments against the claim that moral responsibility is a prerequisite for criminal
responsibility; arguments against the claim that criminal responsibility is a prerequisite
for punishment; and arguments that even if the behavioral science determinist challenge is
valid, it should or must be ignored for prudential reasons (this is one way to read the Herbert Packer argument quoted in the text following this footnote).
23. Herbert L. Packer, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74-75 (1968). Sanford
Kadish expressed a similar view:
The ancient notion of free will may well in substantial measure be a myth. But
even a convinced determinist should reject a governmental regime which is
founded on anything less in its system of authoritative disposition of citizens.
Whether the concept of man as responsible agent is fact or fancy is a very different question from whether we ought to insist that the government in its
coercive dealings with individuals must act on that premise.
Sanford H. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273, 287 (1968); see also
Westen, supra note 2, at 627-28, n. 61 and accompanying text (2005) (discussing Packer
and Kadish and attributing similar views to Oliver Wendell Holmes and several others).
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lem more directly. Rather than treating deterministic evidence from
the behavioral sciences as beyond the pale or out of bounds, this approach treats such evidence as credible but inconsequential. Adopting
the compatibilist view of responsibility, it maintains that, even if
true, the deterministic implications of the behavioral sciences have
no capacity to threaten responsibility. This move has been influential
among theorists who pay concentrated attention to the nature and
problems of responsibility and appears to supply the most persuasive
argument to date against the behavioral science challenge to
criminal responsibility.24
“Compatibilism” is an umbrella term that subsumes diverse accounts of responsibility.25 What these accounts have in common— the
thing that makes them all “compatibilist”—is the claim that the freedom required for responsibility is not “true,” “contra-causal,” “metaphysical” free will. The responsible actor need not originate her acts,
and she can act freely (in the sense required for responsibility) even if
her acts are determined by forces and circumstances beyond her control. On this view, responsibility is “compatible” with determinism—a
determined actor can also be a responsible actor.26
For many people, this claim is startling and counterintuitive: it is
natural to ask, how can I possibly be “free” if my acts are determined? Isn’t this like saying a shingle blown from a roof is “free” to
fall to the ground,27 or a wound watch is “free” to tick?28 The whole
idea seems like a “wretched subterfuge.”29 In response, compatibilists
24. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 2, at 402 (invoking compatibilism to fend off threat
from behavioral sciences).
25. For recent surveys of compatibilism, see generally Michael McKenna, Compatibilism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2004), http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/sum2004/entries/compatibilism; Robert Kane, Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 3-41 (Robert Kane
ed., 2002); DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL 89-126 (2001).
26. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
543 (1997). Influential examples include JOHN MARTIN FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA,
RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL: A THEORY OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 62-91 (1998); R. J.
WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 147-153 (1994); SUSAN WOLF,
FREEDOM WITHIN REASON 24-26 (1990).
27. See, e.g., ILHAM DILMAN, FREE WILL: AN HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL
INTRODUCTION 46 (1999) (quoting SIMONE WEIL, ON SCIENCE, NECESSITY, AND THE LOVE OF
GOD, 177 (1968) (“Those whom we call criminals are only tiles blown off a roof by the wind
and falling at random.”)).
28. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 100-01 (Oskar Piest
ed., Lewis White Beck trans., Liberal Arts Press 1956) (1788) (suggesting that the so called
freedom we enjoy in the determinist universe is “no better than the freedom of a turnspit,
which when once wound up also carries out its motions of itself”); Hospers, Psychoanalysis,
supra note 12, at 463, 465 (freedom in a determined world is just the “freedom of the machine to stamp labels on cans when it has been devised for just that purpose”).
29. KANT, supra note 28 at 99-100.(“It is a wretched subterfuge to seek an escape in
the supposition that the kind of determining grounds of his causality according to natural
law agrees with a comparative concept of freedom. . . . In the question of freedom which lies
at the foundation of all moral laws and accountability to them, it is really not at all a ques-
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have explained that, while responsibility requires freedom, the freedom involved in responsibility is not freedom from causation—not
“true,” “contra-causal,” “metaphysical” freedom—but freedom from
coercion or from other constraints on chosen action.30
At the heart of this view is the idea that a person is free if she can
do as she chooses.31 Not everyone has this freedom: a man in chains
is not free to walk away, for example. It may also be necessary for the
free actor to have certain basic features, or certain cognitive and executive capacities, such as the capacity for rational thought,32 or responsiveness to reasons,33 or a proper mesh of first order and higher
order desires.34 When the agent lacks these capacities and features,
her choices don’t seem like choices at all. But there is nothing about
causation or determinism that necessarily blocks this sort of freedom:
a choice is still a choice even when it is caused or determined, and
nothing about being caused is inconsistent with having capacities
and features like practical reasoning or responsiveness to reasons. If
I decide to have a piece of pie because I like pie and see no good reason not to have the pie, and if I have the usual capacities for practical
reasoning and so on, my having the pie is chosen and therefore free.
This is true even if my desire for the pie was written into my genes or
programmed in me by lifelong exposure to seductive ads for pie, and
even if my failure to recognize, understand, or act upon some very
good reasons not to have the pie is determined by the unchosen limits
on my perceptual, cognitive, and executive capacities. In other words,
choices are choices even when they are caused or determined. And
according to the compatibilist, the freedom to act as you choose
(whether or not your choice is caused or determined) is enough for responsibility. This, the compatibilists say, is why we would distinguish between a person who angrily throws a rock at us and a hillside that drops a rock on our head. Even if both events are determined, it makes sense to treat the intentional throw as a different
sort of event than the mindless drop. Even when a choice is determined, it is loaded with meaning that a brute physical event cannot
have. This extra meaning, the compatibilists say, is strong evidence
that freedom to act as one chooses is all that responsibility requires.
“True” free will is not necessary.
tion of whether the causality determined by a natural law is necessary through determining grounds lying within or without the subject . . . .”).
30. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 10, at 437-44; MOORE, supra note 26, at 543.
31. As the discussion below shows, this initial formulation is an oversimplification.
32. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 26, at 500-02 (discussing how insanity, involuntary
intoxication, and infancy excuse criminal responsibility).
33. See FISCHER & RAVIZZA, supra note 26, at 62-91.
34. See Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, in FREE
WILL 323 (Gary Watson ed., 2004); Gary Watson, Free Agency, in FREE WILL 337, 338
(Gary Watson ed., 2004).
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If the compatibilists are right, the determinist threat suggested by
the behavioral sciences seems to lose its force. Even if the behavioral
sciences suggest that much or all of what we do is caused, causation
need not operate in a way inconsistent with choice. On the contrary,
it is entirely plausible that the forces and circumstances that the behavioral sciences highlight exercise their power over us by causing
our choices. If so, behavioral science findings suggesting that human
acts are caused need not pose any threat to responsibility. So long as
that evidence leaves room for choice (even if that choice is determined), behavioral science’s insinuations of determinism are neither
here nor there for responsibility. Rather than rejecting behavioral
science evidence of causation in human conduct as beyond the pale,
the compatibilist can treat it as inconsequential.
III. THE POWER OF THE PARTICULARS: HOW THE BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE CHALLENGE TRANSCENDS THE COMPATIBILIST MOVE
The compatibilist move has been influential among criminal
theorists versed in responsibility theory, most of whom take compatibilism to be a complete answer to determinist challenges to responsibility and thus a complete answer to the challenge from the behavioral sciences. Indeed, the compatibilist move has been so successful
that the idea that the behavioral sciences might threaten criminal
responsibility is now sometimes jovially characterized as a sort of pathology.35 Nevertheless, I will argue that the compatibilist move is
not sufficient to dispatch the challenge from the behavioral sciences.
Indeed, the compatibilist move fails to address the most potent feature of that challenge, which lies not in its suggestions of determinism, but in the particularistic character of its evidence.
The problem for compatibilism is that the behavioral sciences
supply a wealth of detail regarding the causes of human action, and
that reflecting on this detail amplifies a common and powerful incompatibilist moral intuition. The intuition, which I will call the “originationist intuition,” has been at the center of recent debate about
determinism and responsibility. It holds that a person can only be responsible for acts she originates.36 Because this intuition suggests
that a person cannot be responsible for a determined act, it poses a
serious problem for compatibilism. The behavioral sciences make this
problem even worse. Describing some of the causes of human acts in
vivid, specific, concrete detail, the behavioral sciences bring determinism to life. In so doing, they induce us to engage in an especially
searching and personal reflection on determinism and its ramifica35. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 2, at 397.
36. For examples of originationism in the recent debate, see sources cited in footnote
42, infra.
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tions. This process, in turn, charges up the originationist intuition
and thereby energizes the argument that it is wrong to hold a person
responsible for a determined act.
The behavioral science challenge, then, operates in two ways: in
addition to suggesting that determinism is true, the behavioral
sciences amplify the intuition that a person cannot be responsible for
a determined act. The compatibilist move parries the first thrust by
providing a theoretical account of responsibility in which persons can
be held responsible even if determinism is true. Such abstraction,
however, is ill-suited to meet the second thrust’s intuition-amplifying
particularism. In this sense, the compatibilist move—an abstract answer to determinism conceived abstractly—offers no reply to the
threat presented by the nitty-gritty determinism of the behavioral
science challenge.
A. The Originationist Intuition
While compatibilism is currently the leading position in the free
will debate, compatibilists have yet to satisfy a significant school of
philosophers who maintain that responsibility requires “true,” “genuine,”37 “metaphysical,”38 “transcendental,”39 or “contra-causal”40 free
will, and that determinism and responsibility are therefore mutually
exclusive. In the course of the long history of the debate, these “incompatibilists” have offered many and diverse arguments in support
of the “true” free will requirement. Today, several influential incompatibilist arguments place significant weight on the originationist intuition, which has emerged as an especially stubborn obstacle
for compatibilism.41
37. See Strawson, supra note 19, at 74 (using this language but rejecting the view
it describes).
38. See generally Watson, supra note 34, at 222.
39. See R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 13 (1994) (associating this expression with Kant).
40. See Strawson, supra note 19, at 79; see also MOORE, supra note 26, at 597.
41. While the incompatibilist position has sometimes been tied to the intuition that an
actor chooses freely if he could have done otherwise, recent scholarship often grounds incompatibilism in the intuition that origination is a prerequisite for responsibility. See, e.g.,
PEREBOOM, supra note 25, at 4; Michael Corrado, Automatism and the Theory of Action, 39
EMORY L.J. 1191, 1192, 1212 (1990); Galen Strawson, On “Freedom and Resentment,” in
FREE WILL AND THE REACTIVE ATTITUDES 85, 96 (Michael McKenna & Paul Russell eds.,
2008);). See generally Anders Kaye, The Secret Politics of the Compatibilist Criminal Law,
55 U. KAN. L. REV. 365 (2007 [hereinafter Kaye, Secret Politics] (explaining the originationist intuition, with extensive citation to originationist scholarship). The term “origination”
has not always been widely used, but origination language is becoming more common. See,
e.g., Scott W. Howe, Reassessing the Individualization Mandate in Capital Sentencing:
Darrow’s Defense of Leopold and Loeb, 79 IOWA L. REV. 989, 1019–21 (1994); Robert Kane,
Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF FREE WILL 3, 5 (Robert Kane ed., 2002); Michael McKenna, Source Incompatibilism, Ultimacy, and the Transfer of Non-Responsibility, 38 AM. PHIL. Q. 37, 40 (2001); Derk Pereboom, Determinism al Dente, in FREE WILL 243, 245 n.7 (Derk Pereboom ed., 1997); Gary
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1. The Essence of the Originationist Intuition
The essence of the originationist intuition is that a person must
originate an act in order to be morally responsible for that act.42 That
is, she must be the “ultimate”43 or “regressive”44 cause of her act,
meaning that the act was not determined by forces and circumstances outside her control. Her act must be “governable by her self ad
Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme, in
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
256, 282 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987); Roy C. Weatherford, Compatibilism and Incompatibilism, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 144, 144 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995).
Other terms have been used to identify the origination requirement. See, e.g., PEREBOOM,
supra 25, at 54 (referring to the concept as the “Causal History Principle”); Susan L. Hurley, Debate: Luck, Responsibility, and the ‘Natural Lottery,’ 10 J. POL. PHIL. 79, 82 (2002)
(“Lack of control of causes is . . . incompatible with responsibility,” and “responsibility requires regressive control.”); Anders Kaye, Resurrecting the Causal Theory of the Excuses,
83 NEB. L. REV. 1116, 1117 (2005) (calling “the moral principle that actors cannot be
blamed for conduct caused by forces beyond their control” the “control principle”) [hereinafter Kaye, Causal Theory]; Dana K. Nelkin, Moral Luck, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY § 1, 2004, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2004/entries/moral-luck (stating that the “Control Principle” holds that “we are morally assessable only to the extent
that what we are assessed for depends on factors under our control”).
42. See, e.g., PEREBOOM, supra note 25, at 4 (“[A] claim about origination . . . might be
formulated as follows . . . an agent is not morally responsible for [a] decision if it is produced by a source over which she has no control.”); Michael Corrado, Addiction and Causation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 913, 915 (2000) (“If there is an unbroken causal history for a
certain action, extending back to some event over which the agent had no control, then the
agent is not (morally) responsible for that action.”) [hereinafter Corrado, Addiction]; Corrado, Automatism, supra note 41, at 1201, 1225 (“I am responsible only for those things
that are up to me; to be responsible, I must have some say in the matter. But I have no say
in the matter of caused action.” For an actor to be responsible for an act, “[t]he volition . . .
that leads to the behavior must be the first event in a causal chain . . . and must itself be
uncaused.”); Delgado, supra note 6, at 55 (“[B]lame is inappropriate when a defendant’s
criminal behavior is caused by extrinsic factors beyond his or her control.”); Kane, Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free Will Debates, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
FREE WILL, supra note 41, at 3, 5 (“[W]e believe we have free will when . . . the origin or
source of our choices and actions is in us and not in anyone or anything else over which we
have no control.”); Weatherford, supra note 41, at 144 (“The incompatibilist defends his
view by arguing that a free act must involve . . . the freedom to choose called origination.”);
see also DANIEL DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING
76 (1984) (noting that “[w]e want to be able to say of ourselves, as Harry Truman famously
said, ‘the buck stops here,’ “ but rejecting the origination requirement).
43. PEREBOOM, supra note 25, at xv (“[M]oral responsibility requires actions to
have . . . causal histories that make agents ultimate sources of their actions.”); McKenna,
supra note 41, at 40-41 (2001) (describing the “ultimacy condition,” which holds that a person is not responsible for her acts if she is not the ultimate source of her acts); WOLF, supra
note 26, at 10 (describing, but not endorsing, the view that “there is a requirement that the
agent’s control be ultimate—her will must be determined by her self, and her self must not,
in turn, be determined by anything external to itself”); Paul Russell, Pessimists, Pollyannas, and the New Compatibilism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 228, 248 (Robert Kane ed., 2002) (discussing the “capacity for ultimate control”).
44. See S.L. HURLEY, JUSTICE, LUCK, AND KNOWLEDGE 17, 111 (2003) (describing the
regression requirement and stating that “to be responsible for something you must be responsible for its causes,” thus, “[r]egressive control of X requires control of X’s causes as
well as of X itself”). Hurley rejects the notion that regressive control is required for moral
responsibility. Id. at 80-105.
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infinitum”;45 she must “will” her act “without being caused to will
it.”46 Of course, other forces and circumstances will influence her or
play a role in bringing about her act (indeed, she would not have existed, let alone acted, but for such forces and circumstances). But if
the act was determined by forces and circumstances beyond her control, then the original cause of the act lies in those forces and circumstances, not in the actor, and she is not responsible for it. As philosopher Derk Pereboom puts it, “if an action results from a deterministic causal process that traces back to factors beyond the control of
the agent, he is not morally responsible for the action.”47
Like other moral intuitions invoked in the debates about free will
and responsibility, the originationist intuition can seem at once natural and obscure. At least some facets of this intuition, however, are
accessible. For example, the originationist intuition has a strong connection to concerns about fairness: it feels natural to say that the
reason a person should not be blamed for an act she did not originate
is that this would be unfair. The unfairness, in turn, seems to have
several different facets. For example, it may be unfair to blame a
nonoriginator in the way that charging the wrong person is unfair.
Something else is the origin of the act, not her; that “something else”
should bear the brunt of our negative reactions to her wrongdoing.
Relatedly, it may be unfair for the reason that doing so involves an
element of arbitrariness. The causal chain leading to her act was long
and diverse, but all the attention and feelings associated with blame
have been focused on a single link in the chain—the actor herself.
She might contend that excising her action from the causal chain this
way is morally random, an artifact of the amoral fact that human beings tend to notice human beings more readily than they notice other
things. Along another line, blaming her may be unfair in that it
treats her differently than others (those who are not being blamed)
without sufficient justification. True, she has done a bad act that
they have not done; but if she did not originate the act—if the act was
the result of forces and circumstances beyond her control—then it is
not clear that her bad act distinguishes her from the rest of us in a
way that can justify imposing a distinctive and undesirable moral as45. WOLF, supra note 26, at 35.
46. Michael Louis Corrado, Responsibility and Control, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 78
n.83 (2005); see also Corrado, Automatism, supra note 41, at 1192 (“Actions are not voluntary unless they are up to the actor, and actions that are caused by prior conditions are not
up to the actor.”).
47. Pereboom, Determinism al Dente, supra note 41, at 246. More colloquially, “if
agents’ acts are caused by factors for which they are not responsible, then how can they be
morally responsible for acting as the result of those factors?” MARTHA KLEIN,
DETERMINISM, BLAMEWORTHINESS, AND DEPRIVATION 50 (1990); see also Corrado, Addiction, supra note 42, at 915 (using similar formulation); Corrado, Automatism, supra note
41, at 1201, n.80 and accompanying text (same).

554

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:539

sessment on her alone. In some ways, these are concerns about moral
luck: when the actor does not originate her act, forces and circumstances beyond her control determine that she will be blamed in the
same way that lottery ping-pong balls decide who will be a millionaire, and that seems worrisome. They also reflect concerns that conceptually severing the actor from the environment that shaped her
act—making her bear the burden of our reactions alone—involves a
kind of moral tunnel vision, an impoverishing exclusion of morally relevant facts. Such moral luck and tunnel vision concerns suggest,
among other things, a deep underlying concern about fairness.
The originationist intuition has other sorts of roots too. For example, it seems to be connected to attitudes like empathy, compassion,
and identification. When theorists set out to explain why causal explanations of human acts tend to defuse blaming reactions, they often
cite the French proverb “tout comprendre, c’est tout pardoner” (“to
understand all is to forgive all”).48 Similarly, they suggest that causal
explanations help us stand “in the other’s shoes,” and they invoke
ideas like “it could have been me” and “there but for the grace of God
go I.”49 One way to understand why these proverbs and ideas are fitting here is that learning about the forces and circumstances that
cause a person to act seems to catalyze a change in our own thoughts
and feelings. It seems to connect us to the actor in an intimate way.
We empathize with the actor: with the causal details of his life laid in
front of us, we slip imaginatively “into his shoes” and experience
thoughts and feelings that echo or mimic his. At the same time, we
identify with the actor, for cataloging the distinctive causal influences involved in his distinctive conduct makes it easier to see how,
but for those influences, he could have been a “normal,” familiar person with a “normal,” familiar life. Now we see how we “could have
been” him, but for “the grace of God.” These empathetic and identifying reactions throw cold water onto our hot reactions to wrongdoing.
Perhaps this is because empathy and identification are so conducive
to compassion, and there is a tension between the tenderness of compassion and the pain we normally associate with being blamed. Per48. MOORE, supra note 26, at 488, n.11 (“The proverb is usually taken to assume that
one understands another’s behaviour when one knows the causes of that behavior.”).
These sentiments have sometimes been associated with incompatibilism generally,
rather than originationism in particular. The primary reason for this association, I think,
is that originationism’s central role in incompatibilism has only recently crystallized in responsibility theory. But even in the time before originationism came to the fore, theorists
discussing these sentiments discussed them in ways that clearly tied them to the originationist intuition. See, for example, Michael Moore’s discussion of the Yale killer, in
PLACING BLAME, in which Moore attempts to defuse our intuitive reactions to information
about certain formative influences in the killer’s life. Id. at 578-83. His invocation of these
sentiments speaks not to the alternate possibilities flavor of incompatibilism, but to the
originationist one.
49. See Hospers, Freedom, supra note 12, at 41.
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haps it is because we scrutinize rationales for blame more closely
when we are in the shoes of the blamed; imagining how blame will
feel to them and imagining it happening to us may inspire us to take
a more critical look at those rationales. Or perhaps it is because we
imagine more vividly and personally what it means to be determined
and in so doing discover a latent tension between being determined
and being blamed. The result is that knowing how causal explanations of human acts undercut the impulse to blame, we become reluctant to blame actors for acts they did not originate.
The intuition also seems to be grounded in a stubborn and ubiquitous feature of popular or folk psychology.50 As philosopher Galen
Strawson writes, our “sense of self is of a profoundly libertarian cast
[such that we] naturally and unreflectively conceive[] [ourselves] . . .
as standing in some special . . . relation of true-responsibilitycreating origination to [our] choices and actions.”51 This folk psychology notion that we can escape the causal calculus and that this is
something special and distinctive about us feeds directly into folk
theories of responsibility: on these theories, this special fact about
us—that we can and do originate our acts—is an important piece of
the story about why it is appropriate to hold us responsible. In this
light, our capacity for origination makes it seem natural that “determinism is incompatible with freedom,”52 augmenting “the power of
the basic incompatibilist intuition.”53
Grounded, then, in concerns about fairness, in attitudes like empathy and identification, and in a core component of folk psychology,
the originationist intuition is (for many people) an appealing and
natural-seeming one. Not surprisingly, it also appears to be quite
common. In formal philosophy, it is associated with two traditional
and often defended lines of thought—”hard determinism” (the view
that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism and that
determinism is true),54 and libertarianism (the view that moral responsibility is inconsistent with determinism, and that determinism
is false)55—and with the concern that attributions of responsibility
should not turn on “moral luck.”56 Philosophers typically describe the

50. As I have suggested in the text, I think the moral intuitions involved in the responsibility debate are complex and, in some ways, obscure. In keeping with this view, I
expect that I have only scratched the surface of the ideas, concerns, values, and attitudes
that fund the originationist intuition. For some related discussion, see Part III.B., infra.
51. Strawson, supra note 40, at 95.
52. Id. at 88.
53. Id. (stating that it is “a natural fact about … beings like ourselves” that “the incompatibilist intuition has such power for us”).
54. See Weatherford, supra note 41, at 144.
55. See Derk Pereboom, Introduction to FREE WILL vii (Derk Pereboom ed., 1997).
56. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in FREE WILL 174, 174-86 (Gary Watson ed.,
1992) (1982); see generally Nelkin, supra note 41, § 1 (describing “moral luck” as occurring
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intuition as “a widespread attitude”57 that “many people agree”58 with
and “find hard to reject.”59 Indeed, even staunch compatibilists routinely concede that this is a common and powerful intuition for most
people in their daily lives. “Many people,” compatibilist criminal
theorist Stephen Morse writes, “also seem to believe that ‘real’ responsibility is impossible unless people have freedom in the strongest
sense. Unless, that is, people . . . are ‘prime movers unmoved,’ and
the like. . . .”60 This intuition, he says, “exerts a powerful hold on us, a
hold that I am prey to and worries me.”61 Fellow compatibilist Michael Moore suggests something similar when he describes the
“common sense” impulse to excuse that arises when “we come to
know the causes of behavior.”62
The originationist intuition, then, is appealing, common, and natural-seeming, and an important part of both folk and formal theories
of responsibility. It is also incompatible with compatibilism. According to the originationist intuition, a person cannot be responsible for
“when an agent can be correctly treated as an object of moral judgment despite the fact that a
significant aspect of what she is assessed for depends on factors beyond her control”).
57. Pereboom, Determinism al Dente, supra note 41, at 245 n.7 (noting the view that
“compatibilists ignore a widespread attitude about our actions, that moral responsibility
presupposes origination, or agent causation.”); see also Manuel Vargas, Philosophy and the
Folk: On Some Implications of Experimental Work for Philosophical Debates on Free Will, 6
J. OF COGNITION & CULTURE 239 (2006) [hereinafter Vargas, Folk] (explaining that recent
empirical studies support the view that at least one important segment of folk moral intuitions is incompatibilist, though not explicitly identifying the relevant incompatibilist intuitions as originationist); Manuel Vargas, Responsibility and the Aims of Theory: Strawson
and Revisionism, in FREE WILL AND REACTIVE ATTITUDES 297, 297-318 (Michael McKenna
& Paul Russell, eds., 2008) (stating that compatibilist accounts of responsibility must be
seen as revising [modifying and transforming] the account our folk intuitions give us, rather than exemplifying it).
58. PEREBOOM, supra note 25, at xiii (observing that “many people agree that criminals cannot be blameworthy for actions” caused by external influences).
59. Corrado, Addiction, supra note 42, at 916.
60. Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and Conceptual
Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329, 345 (1998).
61. Id. at 347. Philosophers have long used the concept of the “prime-mover unmoved”—an actor who moves himself, rather than being moved by forces and circumstances beyond his control—to describe the originationist intuition. Id. at 345.
62. Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1985)
[hereinafter Moore, Causation]. Other compatibilists concede the ubiquity and power of incompatiblist intuitions, but do not signal as clearly that they are referring to originationist
intuitions in particular. See, e.g., WALLACE, supra note 26, at 58 (discussing “the persistence of incompatibilist elements in our thinking about moral responsibility,” and noting
that “[s]tudents . . . are quite easily led to the conclusion that it would not be justifiable to
hold people morally responsible for what they do if determinism were true . . .”); see also id.
at 222 (discussing the “widespread tendency to think about responsibility in incompatibilist terms” and observing that “students are frequently drawn to incompatibilism as a kind
of default position and tend to view compatibilist arguments with suspicion, as attempts to
talk them out of something that is virtually obvious outside of the classroom.”). But see
HURLEY, supra note 44, at 96 (suggesting that the “regression condition”—related to the
control principle—”is highly controversial between people” because “[i]ndividuals may . . .
have internally conflicting intuitions about whether responsibility must be regressive”).
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an act he does not originate. According to conventional understandings of determinism and origination, a person cannot originate an act
that is determined, for such an act originates with the forces and circumstances that determined it, and not with the actor.63 Therefore, if
the originationist intuition is correct, an actor cannot be responsible
for a determined act. In short, the originationist intuition flatly contradicts the compatibilist claim that a person can be responsible for a
determined act.
The originationist intuition, then, poses a serious problem for
compatibilism and the compatibilist move. It is a common and powerful moral intuition. It is rooted in important concerns about fairness,
in morally significant attitudes like empathy, identification, and
compassion, and in an important vein of folk psychology. And it directly contradicts compatibilism, casting doubt on the compatibilist
defense of responsibility for determined acts.
2. Compatibilist Objections to the Originationist Intuition: The
Mirage Arguments
Compatibilists have long recognized that incompatibilist intuitions like the originationist intuition pose a serious threat to compatibilism, and in response they have offered various sorts of arguments to the effect that these intuitions should not be credited.64 An
especially common move is to argue that such intuitions are illusory
mirages that dissipate upon closer inspection.65 To date, however,
these “mirage arguments” have seemed ad hoc, underdeveloped, and
considerably less robust than the core compatibilist thesis.
For example, compatibilist criminal theorists sometimes argue
that, even if moral intuitions are central to analysis of responsibility,
incompatibilist intuitions (such as the originationist intuition) should
be set aside as specially pathological or perverse. Along these lines,
Michael Moore has characterized incompatibilist intuitions as analogous to optical illusions, like perceptions of sticks half-submerged in
63. McKenna, supra note 41, § 2.2 (2001) (“If determinism is true, [an agent’s] actions
do not originate in her . . . .”).
64. Although the originationist intuition has played a role in incompatibilist arguments for many years, the shift to explicitly originationist arguments in incompatibilism is
still relatively recent. As a result, compatibilists have not always explicitly addressed originationism. Nevertheless, because the originationist intuition has long lurked at least implicitly in incompatibilist argument, compatibilist replies to incompatibilism have often offered (at least implicit) answers to originationist concerns.
65. There are other ways to approach the problem posed by the originationist intuition. For example, a compatibilist might argue that even if this is a common and powerful
moral intuition, moral intuitions are not dispositive to, or not powerful in, or not germane
to, reasoning about responsibility. To the extent that such claims are true, they mitigate or
dissolve entirely the problem posed by the originationist intuition. To my eyes, these sorts
of claims are uncommon in criminal theory regarding responsibility. As a result, my discussion focuses on the sort of argument identified in the text.
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water, which appear bent even though they are not.66 But arguments
like these appear ad hoc: moral intuitions are reliable, except that
here they are not. Without a principled statement of the basis on
which some intuitions are to be rejected, the rejection appears arbitrary. Moreover, it is hard to avoid the impression that the intuition
singled out for doubt is selected precisely because it is inconvenient
to the compatibilist argument, and thus that the argument has been
reverse engineered from the desired result.
A more compelling response to incompatibilist intuitions argues
not that these intuitions can be dismissed as entirely ephemeral illusions, but that these intuitions are like mirages that tend to dissolve
when carefully scrutinized. That is, these are superficial intuitions
that give way to more powerful ones as we move toward reflective
equilibrium (or traverse some other analogous process for refining
moral intuitions). Along these lines, Moore argues that careful reflection reveals that incompatibilist intuitions go hand in hand with paternalism and elitism, and that discovering this partnership strips
incompatibilism of its intuitive appeal.67 This approach is certainly
an improvement over the ad hoc one described above. Even so, it remains too glib in its characterization of incompatibilist intuitions, for
much more work would have to be done to establish that originationism is more conducive to elitism and paternalism than compatibilism,
let alone that incompatibilist intuitions and paternalism are necessarily linked. And even if such a link could be established, it would
only open up the question of what other linkages can be drawn between these two views and other morally and politically unpalatable
attitudes and consequences. Indeed, as I have argued in detail elsewhere, there is good reason to think that compatibilism is much more
closely bound to problematic attitudes and consequences of the sort
that might undermine its intuitive appeal.68 For example, compatibilism is startlingly protective of the socioeconomic and political
status quo and strikingly insensitive to the conditions and experiences of the socioeconomically disadvantaged, suggesting an allegiance to privileged social and political interests.69 The problem with
Moore’s move here, then, is not that it is illegitimate, but that, on the
one hand, it is underdeveloped, and on the other hand, it opens the
door to an array of considerations that reflect more favorably on in66. MOORE, supra note 26, at 544.
67. According to Moore, originationist intuitions are conducive to “elitism and a condescension” and to denying “the equal moral dignity of others.” Id., at 545-46; see also id. at
148-49 (“Such discrimination is a temptation to be resisted, because it is no virtue. It is
elitist and condescending toward others not to grant them the same responsibility and
desert you grant to yourself.”). For another account suggesting that there is something corrupt about these sympathetic attitudes, see DENNETT, supra note 42, at 167.
68. Kaye, Secret Politics, supra note 41, at 380-425.
69. Id. at 405-25.
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compatibilist intuitions than compatibilism. If so, it fails to fend off
the originationist intuition.
Taking another tack, compatibilists have argued that our actual
punishment practices buttress the conclusion that our “real” intuitions are compatibilist.70 The argument starts with an observation
about our actual practices: we excuse some actors who do bad things,
but we do not excuse them all. It then adds a claim about determinism—that determinism (or some functional equivalent) is obviously
true. Finally, it contends that, given these premises, our punishment
practices must reflect compatibilist intuitions. After all, if determinism is true, the incompatibilist must excuse every actor (since the incompatibilist holds that responsibility and determinism are incompatible). Since we do not excuse every actor, we must not be incompatibilists. In this sense, our punishment practices strongly suggest
that our “real” intuitions are compatibilist.71 Even if we are attracted
to origination and other incompatibilist concerns in the abstract, we
are really compatibilists when the chips are down.
Unfortunately, this analysis makes an important error in its evaluation of our punishment practices. Its error is that it presumes that
those who participate in these practices believe determinism (or some
functional equivalent) is true. To support this presumption, compatibilist criminal theorists insist that morally significant indeterminism
is so absurd that most people will, by common sense, reject it.72 The
problem with this argument is that it confuses what people “should”
believe with what people actually believe. In fact, it appears that
most people do not believe determinism is true,73 and that most
people are (in their daily lives) libertarian indeterminists who believe
that people can and do act with “genuine” or “metaphysical” free will
most of the time.74 Indeed, contemporary American political culture
provides strong motivations to reject determinism.75 For example, in
our cultural context, many people experience determinism as deeply
threatening to cherished ideas about individual identity and about
the stature and significance of the human individual.76 Likewise,
70. See Moore, Causation, supra note 62, at 1112.
71. Id. at 1112.
72. See Kaye, Causal Theory, supra note 41, at 1133-35 (2005) (summarizing the partial-determinism critique); see also Moore, Causation, supra note 62, at 1114-28 (criticizing
partial-determinist strategies).
73. See, e.g., Vargas, Folk, supra note 57, at 241 (reviewing empirical research finding
that “95% of the respondents describe[d] [a] . . . universe . . . where human decisionmaking
is not completely determined by prior events . . . as the one most like ours.”); see also Kaye,
Causal Theory, supra note 41, at 1135-37.
74. See, e.g., Strawson, supra note 19.
75. Kaye, Causal Theory, supra note 41, at 1135-57 (setting out reasons to believe that
many people are partial determinists, notwithstanding the apparent implausibility of partial determinism).
76. Id. at 1155.
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people raised in our culture are likely to think that determinism
erodes their control over their actions, future, and destiny, depriving
them of a culturally significant source of confidence and comfort.77
Moreover, determinism has particularly ugly political associations
and resonances in our political culture, being popularly associated
with paternalism and authoritarian governance.78 For reasons like
these, people in our political culture may be strongly motivated to reject determinism. And given the airy, abstract, speculative nature of
the debate about determinism, most people can probably reject determinism without believing that they are being “absurd” or “lying to
themselves,” and without significant cognitive dissonance.79
Even if compatibilist criminal theorists are correct that determinism is true, then, it does not follow that those who have shaped and
implemented our criminal justice institutions are determinists. Indeed, it is much more likely that our criminal justice institutions operate on the presumption that determinism is not true. If so, our punishment practices simply do not support the conclusion that our
“real” intuitions are compatibilist. On the contrary, our punishment
practices are entirely consistent with the widespread and influential
originationist intuition.
Finally, compatibilists have often argued against incompatibilist
intuitions by proposing that we can explain all of our blaming and
excusing intuitions about specific wrongful acts without referring to
“true” free will or origination. That is, we may think “true” free will
and origination are central to our judgments about who to blame, but
they really are not. The argument here generally begins by constructing a list of the scenarios in which we typically excuse wrongful
acts—the actor was insane, or intoxicated, or under duress, and so
forth. At first glance, says the compatibilist, it may appear that the
reason we excuse in these cases is because we see that the wrongdoer’s act was determined (for example, by his mental illness, intoxication, or duress) such that he lacked “true” free will. But closer inspection shows that our excusing practices have nothing to do with
determinism. Rather, we excuse because the actors in these sorts of
cases lack some feature necessary for moral responsibility. For example, they lack the capacity to engage in rational thought. If so, the
compatibilist argues, concerns about “true” free will and origination
play no role in our responsibility attributions. What matters is
whether the actors have certain features, not whether they originated their acts.

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1142.

2010]

POWERFUL PARTICULARS

561

There are, however, several problems with this approach. One
problem is that our ability to construct an alternative, compatibilist
explanation for our excusing practices does not show that the incompatibilist explanation is incorrect.80 The possibility of parallel explanations does not disprove either of the parallels. More subtly, this
approach appears to mistakenly assume that the originationist intuition treats nonorigination as the only basis for excuse. In fact, nothing in the originationist view precludes excusing actors for other reasons (such as intellectual incapacity). The originationist intuition is
not that nonorigination is the only basis for excuse; it is only that
nonorigination is one of the bases for excuse.81 Finally, proponents of
this approach have not yet successfully identified compatibilist explanations for all the cases in which people are intuitively inclined to
excuse apparently determined conduct. On the contrary, incompatibilist philosophers continue to identify scenarios in which many
people have the intuition that the wrongdoer should be excused, apparently just because the wrongdoer’s act was determined.82 To date,
then, the alternative explanation approach has not successfully discredited incompatibilist intuitions. Rather, these intuitions have
proven stubborn and difficult to explain away.
None of this is to say, of course, that incompatibilist intuitions like
the originationist intuition are bulletproof. These intuitions may yet
be discredited. But it is fair to say that, to date, compatibilists have
not yet inflicted a lethal blow on the originationist intuition. On the
contrary, the originationist intuition persists tenaciously in the face
of diverse challenges, a tribute to its stubborn strength.
B. How Originationist Intuitions Are Amplified by Findings in
Behavioral Science
The originationist intuition, then, poses a significant problem for
the compatibilist move and thus for responsibility itself. The
behavioral sciences magnify this problem, for the same behavioral
science findings that suggest determinism also dramatically amplify
our originationist intuitions. To show that this is so, I first explain
how particularistic details can have a significant influence on
intuitions about responsibility, and how this has played to the
advantage of compatibilists in contemporary debates about
determinism and responsibility. I then turn to the special impact of
behavioral science particulars, which I contend amplify our
originationist intuitions in a way that the compatibilist move is not
tailored to counter.
80. Kaye, Causal Theory, supra note 41, at 1142.
81. See Kaye, Secret Politics, supra note 41, at 373.
82. See, e.g., Pereboom, Determinism al Dente, supra note 41, at 248-49.
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1. The Power of the Particular in Intuitions About Responsibility
Moral intuitions usually explored at high levels of abstraction can
look quite different when tested with particularistic examples and
hypotheticals. The recent debates between compatibilists and
incompatibilists show that this is true of intuitions about
responsibility and determinism, which are highly susceptible to the
power of the particular.83
Illustrations of this can be found throughout the literature on
responsibility. For example, as philosopher Manuel Vargas reports,
recent empirical research suggests that manipulating abstraction and
detail in hypotheticals about “determined” wrongful acts influences our
intuitions about blaming determined wrongful actors.84 When presented
with hypotheticals in which the determined wrongful act is described in
abstract terms, people tend to express incompatibilist intuitions; they
indicate that blaming the determined actor seems wrong. In contrast,
when considering wrongful acts that have been described in “concrete
and affect-provoking” detail, people tend to express compatibilist
intuitions; they indicate that blaming the determined actor is
appropriate.85 In other words, manipulating the level of detail in the
description of the wrongdoing significantly influences subjects’ moral
intuitions about blaming determined wrongdoers.86
This phenomenon has played a subtle but important role in the
debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Proponents of
83. A.J. Ayer suggested something similar in an early criticism of Peter Strawson’s
reactive attitude argument. A.J. Ayer, Free Will and Rationality, in FREE WILL AND
REACTIVE ATTITUDES 37, 42-43 (Michael McKenna & Paul Russell eds., 2008). Strawson
argued that the reactive attitudes that sustain our blaming practices would survive proof
of determinism because they are central to human nature and society. Ayer suggested that
Strawson’s claim becomes less plausible if we flesh out determinism in more concrete detail. Id. For example, if we knew that our society implanted our “desires and beliefs and
traits” through something like Skinnerian conditioning, “if it were a matter of common
knowledge that these methods were practised, and if we understood the ways in which they
operated,” then we would abandon the participant-reactive attitudes. Id. at 43. Others
have made similar points. See, e.g., Jonathan Bennett, Accountability (II), in FREE WILL
AND REACTIVE ATTITUDES 47, 67 (Michael McKenna & Paul Russell eds., 2008) (noting that
we are generally much more moved by thinking about harm to an “identified person [than
to] an unidentified group”—concrete details have a stronger pull on our reactions).
84. Vargas, Folk, supra note 57, at 250.
85. Id. at 241 (“In cases where the descriptions are concrete and affect-provoking, we
tend to opt for compatibilist conditions. In cases that are described more abstractly and
that appear to involve less affect, we favor incompatibilist . . . analyses.”).
86. Id. at 248 (“The experimental work yields a . . . lesson important for philosophers
working in this domain. . . . [W]e should very carefully attend to how our own reactions to
various thought experiments . . . might be a function of high-affect triggers . . . of judgment.
. . . [I]f you want your thought experiment to elicit compatibilist intuitions, you would do
well to frame the example in terms that trigger emotional reactions, reactions whose presence tends to strongly favor compatibilist reactions. The reverse is true for incompatibilists.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 249 (speculating that “the more concrete and emotionallyladen a . . . case is made to be, the higher the rate at which people will want to ascribe
moral responsibility.”).
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compatibilism have sometimes employed the power of the particular
in their efforts to show that blaming determined actors is consistent
with our moral intuitions about responsibility. For example, they
have asked us to reflect upon our intuitions about cases of
wrongdoing in which the wrongful act is described in vivid, specific
detail. Such detailed descriptions tend to catalyze intense reactions
in us. Their awful facts trigger powerful, visceral indignation,
resentment, anger, and fear, and these reactions in turn feed directly
into punitive moral attitudes. The compatibilist also offers a
potential causal explanation for the wrongdoing, but presents it quite
abstractly and with very little detail. Sometimes the compatibilist
suggests that the wrongdoer’s act was caused by a hard life or
parental abuse.87 Sometimes, the deterministic explanation is
relegated to total abstraction—the compatibilist merely grants or
assumes arguendo that determinism is true, and offers no details
whatsoever as to what particular causes were implicated in the
wrongdoing. Typical reactions to these generalities tend to be muted
and amorphous. With these pieces in place—a particularly described
wrongdoing and an highly abstract causal explanation—the
compatibilist then asks us whether knowing about the causal
explanation dissipates our punitive attitudes toward the wrongdoer.
Generally, it does not; we remain viscerally punitive even when we
are presented with the causal explanation.88 At the level of our moral
intuitions, then, responsibility and determinism must be compatible.
Incompatibilists use particulars in a mirror image fashion to make
the opposite point. Like the compatibilists, they seek to persuade us
by inviting us to reflect upon our intuitions about cases of determined
wrongdoing. But in their cases, the wrongdoing is described
abstractly (they posit that a person has done something wrong, but
label the wrong in a generic and abstract way), while the causal
explanation for the wrongdoing is fleshed out in more substantial
detail.89 Not surprisingly, their example plays differently in our
87. For example, Moore discusses “the sympathy we may feel for wrongdoers whose
wrongdoing was caused by factors such as social adversity or psychological abuse during
childhood,” but does not go further to flesh out what relationship those factors might have
to wrongdoings. MOORE, supra note 26, at 544.
88. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 26, at 145 (describing Richard Herrin’s murder of
Bonnie Garland by asking us to imagine “it was you who had intentionally smashed open
the skull of a 23-year-old woman with a claw hammer whiles she was asleep, a woman
whose fatal defect was a desire to free herself from your too clinging embrace?”); id at 148
(juxtaposing Herrin’s horrible crime with reasons that might make us question propriety of
blaming him, including that “he grew up in the barrio of East Los Angeles” and “found Yale
an alien and disorienting culture”); id. at 148-49 (observing that our feelings about Herrin’s
crime – even taking into account his background – support holding him responsible).
89. See, e.g., Hospers, Freedom, supra note 12, at 33 (describing the wrongful act in a
three word phrase—“strangl[ing] several persons”—while the (Freudian) causal explanation takes up about half a page).
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intuitions. The abstractly described wrongdoing does not move us in
the way that the compatibilist’s vividly described wrongdoing did, but
the concrete and specific details in the causal explanation give the
deterministic mechanism a heft and significance it did not have
before. Now it is the deterministic explanation that provokes a
visceral reaction. Its details engage our attention and imagination
more fully, inviting extended reflection and exploration, such that we
become more likely to contemplate and explore the potential
problems with holding the determined actor responsible. At the
intuitive level, the vivid causal explanation tends to blot out the
amorphous generic wrongdoing, and pushes us toward the
incompatibilist view.90
Gary Watson’s influential article on the reactive attitudes nicely
illustrates these dynamics.91 Watson presents a highly detailed
account of a double murder and speculates (correctly, I believe) that
the account evokes outrage and horror in most readers .92 For
example, reading that the killer told two hostages they were free to
go, then shot them in the back as they walked away, we are likely to
vividly imagine the hostages’ experience—their terrible anxiety, the
glimmerings of hope, the sudden terrible shattering of that hope.93
Similarly, reading that the killer’s brother watched the killer
consume a hamburger taken from one of the victims just a little while
after the killing,94 we stand in the observing brother’s shoes, sharing
in one brother’s horror at the other brother’s callousness.95 And,
learning that the killer fantasized about posing as a police officer and
personally telling the victims’ parents about the killings,96 we see him
through the eyes of those parents, sharing in the grief and
denigration they would feel if he confronted them. The details in the
story make the killer’s acts vivid for us; they induce us to visualize
the gruesome events, place ourselves at the frightening scene, and
90. See, e.g., Pereboom, Determinism al Dente, supra note 41, at 245 (describing a hypothetical crime as follows: “Mr. Green kills Ms. Peacock for the sake of some personal advantage”); id at 246-48 (offering several variations on the case in which the causal explanation for Mr. Green’s crime is set out in considerably more detail, and suggesting in each
case that our intuition is that Mr. Green is not responsible for the crime).
91. GARY WATSON, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian
Theme, in AGENCY AND ANSWERABILITY: SELECTED ESSAYS 219-59 (Gary Watson ed.,
2d ed. 2004).
92. Id. at 235-38 (quoting Miles Corwin, Icy Killer’s Life Steeped in Violence, LOS
ANGELES TIMES (May 16, 1982)).
93. Indeed, cognitive psychology teaches that this scenario will elicit especially powerful feelings in us, for it juxtaposes a terrible outcome with an easily imagined counterfactual in which tragedy is averted. Such “near miss” cases have an especially powerful impact on our feelings.
94. Id. at 236.
95. As Watson notes, the killer’s brother “became nauseated and ran to the bathroom.” Id. (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).
96. Id. at 237.
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identify with the deceived and despairing victims. Our reactions to
the story have the force and heft of a strong personal, imaginative,
and emotional engagement with a terrible wrong, and these in turn
are a potent fuel for powerfully punitive reactive attitudes. As
Watson puts it, “[w]e respond to his heartlessness and viciousness
with moral outrage and loathing”;97 he seems the “ ‘archetypal
candidate’ for blame.”98
Having presented a particularistic account of the wrongdoing,
Watson then drops the other shoe, giving extensive detail about the
killer’s horrific formative experiences.99 Now Watson speculates
(again correctly, I think) that our punitive reactions will be
dampened.100 According to Watson’s story, the killer was born nearly
three months premature after his father assaulted his pregnant
mother, accusing her of infidelity.101 During his childhood, his
alcoholic father often beat him, inflicting serious injury.102 His
mother, in turn, was “never able to love him.”103 His birth had caused
her permanent pain and injury, and his father constantly abused her,
and as a result she “turned . . . against her son.”104 She blamed him
for “all of her problems [and came to] hate” him.105 A sister
remembered that when he was little,
[h]e wanted love so bad he would beg for any kind of physical
contact. He’d come up to my mother and just try to rub his little
hands on her leg or her arm. . . . She’d just push him away or kick
him. One time she bloodied his nose when he was trying to get
close to her.106

By the time he was fourteen, he was in federal detention, where he
was “raped several times” and “slashed his wrists twice in suicide
attempts.”107 Over time, his sister “saw every grain of sweetness, pity
and goodness in him destroyed . . . .”108
Again, as the story unfolds, we are drawn in. Now we stand in the
shoes of the little boy, feeling some of the fear and confusion and pain
he felt when his father attacked him and when he saw his father
attack his mother. Now we imagine how it felt to be so completely
(and violently) rejected by his mother, how the rejection must have
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 238.
Id.
Id. at 239-42 (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).
Id. at 242.
Id. at 240-41 (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).
Id.
Id. at 240 (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).
Id. (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).
Id. (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).
Id. at 240-41 (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).
Id. at 241 (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).
Id. at 239 (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).
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engendered heart-rending despair, how it slowly corroded the
“sweetness, pity, and goodness in him.”109 Now we begin to piece
together a puzzle: the boy’s parents hurt him in the deepest way a
person can be hurt; at the same time, they taught him sadistic
violence and cruelty; so when the boy became strong enough to do so,
he punished the world for the intolerable pain his parents caused
him by engaging in the sadistic destruction they taught him. We feel
sympathy for the killer and perhaps come to see him as a victim
himself.110 We understand that “it could have been me”—that we
might have done terrible things if we had been exposed to the
astonishing formative influences the killer was exposed to.111 The
concrete and particular details have catalyzed a deep, textured, and
careful reflective process, and the now vibrant causal story eats away
at the impulse to blame. The experience pushes against our initial
punitive reactions, nudging us back toward incompatibilism.112
In this way, intuitions about responsibility and determinism are
highly susceptible to particularism. The more particularly we see a
wrongdoing or the causal explanation for that wrongdoing, the more
likely we are to engage the wrongdoing or the causal explanation in
the sort of active, imaginative, exploratory way that brings it into
contact with our most deep-seated aversions, desires, fears, hopes,
and values. Vivid facts awaken moral sensitivity. This is why (or part
of why) particularistic examples can amplify moral intuitions in such
striking ways. Watson himself signals this when, in the course of
providing two long, detailed excerpts regarding the double murder,
he “ask[s] for the reader’s patience” on the ground that “[i]t is very
important here to work with realistic and detailed examples.”113
Though Watson does not explain why this is very important, a very
plausible explanation is that detail influences our moral intuitions
regarding determined wrongdoing in a significant way.
109. Id. (quoting Corwin, supra note 92).
110. See id. at 244-45.
111. Id. at 245-46.
112. Id. at 242-43. Other philosophers point to the same insights Watson does. Jonathan Bennett, for example, who traces our blaming practice to our reactive attitudes, notes
that “one can dispel a hostile reactive feeling by cultivating objectivity of attitude towards
the offender.” Bennett, supra note 83, at 53. In his view, “[t]o adopt the objective attitude
towards something is to inquire into how it is structured and/or how it functions.” Id. And
his impression is that once one begins to have “naturalistic thoughts” about conduct, to
have “intense thoughts about the causes,” the “affront ceases to be an offence. . . .” Id. at
58. He suggests that such naturalistic thoughts are “psychologically immiscible” with
blaming attitudes, so that the more we look at the causes, the less we are inclined to
blame. Id. at 57. “I cannot imagine,” he writes, “anyone thinking hard about the causation
of behavior while continuing to boil with rage against the malefactor.” Id. at 58. One way to
understand this is in terms of the power of the particular: perhaps the reason that objective, cause-focused thinking is so destructive to blaming attitudes is that such thinking
necessarily involves deep involvement with particularistic detail.
113. WATSON, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil, supra note 91, at 238 n.14.
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2. Compatibilism’s Traditional Particularism Advantage
Watson’s examples also highlight something else important about
the role of the particular in the debate between compatibilists and
incompatibilists. While compatibilists and incompatibilists can both
use particulars to advance their causes, compatibilists have generally
had it easier when it comes to generating favorable particularistic
examples. This is a function of the difference between the phenomena
the two sides seek to bring to life.
For the compatibilist, the primary goal is to bring his audience
into deep engagement with the wrongdoer’s wrongful act and its
awful consequences. The deeper and more complex this engagement,
the more likely we are to have strong emotional and moral reactions
to the wrongful act, and the more likely those reactions are to include
reactions commonly associated with blaming, like outrage, disgust,
fear, and anger. Thus, capitalizing on the power of the particular
means, for the compatibilist, describing the wrongdoer’s wrongful act
itself. And, as Watson’s example suggests, this is something we
rarely have trouble doing. A wrongful act is typically a discrete
human act that can be seen or visualized easily. There are only a few
human beings involved (the wrongdoer, a victim, and so on); the
wrongdoer engages in a relatively simple sequence of physical
movements (points the gun, pulls the trigger, etc.); those movements
occur in a relatively short period of time (a shooting takes a few
seconds; a bank robbery takes several minutes); its effects usually
manifest almost immediately (the bullet enters the chest and causes
death) and in easily described ways (the victim was killed, his leg
was broken, she was terrified); and its most important further
consequences are easy to describe and imagine (e.g., loved ones feel
sorrow at the loss). In short, it is easy to set out a realistic, detailed,
and engaging description of a bad act and its most important
consequences. And, needless to say, this is especially easy for
criminal theorists. After all, we are immersed in a law saturated with
meticulously documented and elaborately articulated accounts of
injury, cruelty, and wrong—our criminal law casebooks and reporters
are full of them. Thus, mobilizing the power of the particular to elicit
and augment intuitions conducive to compatibilism has never been a
difficult task.
On the other side of the coin, incompatibilists face a more difficult
challenge, for they are tasked with representing a very different sort
of phenomenon. In order to capitalize on the power of the particular,
the incompatibilist must induce his audience into deep engagement
with the causes of the wrongdoer’s act. If he can lay out a concrete,
realistic, and detailed account of the causes of a wrongful act, he can
induce his audience to engage with those causes emotionally, thereby
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catalyzing emotional reactions like the sympathetic and empathic
reactions that Watson described. If he can offer such a particularistic
account he can catalyze careful reflection on the moral significance of
the particular causes involved—such as the reflections about fairness
and moral luck Watson described. Thus, for the incompatibilist,
capitalizing on the power of the particular means describing in
concrete, realistic detail the causes of the wrongdoer’s wrong.
The problem for the incompatibilist is that telling a credible,
detailed story about the causes of a wrongdoing has traditionally
been much harder then telling a similar story about the wrong itself.
It is much more difficult to see the causal machinery behind an act
than it is to see the act itself. In most cases, the causes of wrongful
acts are exceedingly complex; they are yoked together in long,
branching causal chains that disappear into the murky past. They
include all those things that shape our choices and wills—all those
things that give us our distinctive balance of preferences, desires,
values, traits, dispositions, capacities, and impairments. They
include a lifetime’s incremental accumulation of pains and pleasures,
opportunities and pressures, formative and reinforcing experiences.
They involve many human actors (parents, siblings, other family,
friends, teachers, and so on) acting in diverse settings (the home, the
school, the playground, the workplace, etc.), sometimes operating
directly on the actor (through direct encounters and communication)
and sometimes indirectly (for example, through media products or
institutional policies that influence the actor). At the same time, they
include the almost always invisible and complex genetic and
physiological determinants of the actor’s traits, preferences,
capacities, and impairments. They include environmental
phenomena—brute physical conditions, economic circumstances,
cultural institutions—that can be extraordinarily complex and
equally subtle. And a credible causal account must not only catalog
the relevant causes, but also make accessible the complex
interactions between them, and their relationships to the act
ultimately caused. As a result, it is exceedingly difficult to offer a
passably credible causal account of a human act. It is more plausibly
attempted in a novel114 or a biography than a philosopher’s
hypothetical. This may be why so much of the incompatibilist
literature revolves around hypotheticals in which nefarious demons,
magicians, and super-scientists cause people to act, or in which

114. For an especially ambitious example of a novel perhaps attempting a partial construction of the causal history of a wrongful act, see JOSEPH HELLER, SOMETHING
HAPPENED (2d. ed. 1974).
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androids are constructed to act in certain ways.115 These strange
fantasies stand in as enormously simplified symbols for real human
actors moved by immensely complex real causal mechanisms. In
short, telling credible particularistic stories about the causes of
wrongful acts has always been dramatically more difficult than
telling similar stories about the acts themselves.
What this suggests is that compatibilists have generally had the
distinct advantage in telling stories that capitalize on the power of
the particular. In order to use particulars to summon blamefavorable reactions, the compatibilist need only particularistically
describe a wrongdoing itself. Her task is to describe an event that
occurred in a short time frame, in a discrete physical location,
involving a few steps and easy to describe consequences. The
incompatibilist, in contrast, has a much more difficult task. In order
to use particulars to summon blame-opposing reactions, she must
offer a particularistic account of the causal forces and circumstances
that led to the act. Her task is to plumb the murky depths of a
person’s history, to trace back numerous causal chains, to collect all
the countless and diverse incremental nudges and pushes that
produced the wrongful act, and to show how they worked together to
produce the deed. This is a very daunting task.
Particulars, then, play an important role in debates about
responsibility. Properly selected particulars induce us to reflect on
wrongful acts or their causes in a deeply engaged, textured, and
personal way, and this can be a potent catalyst for intuitions about
blame. It can amp up blame-supporting intuitions, or cultivate
blame-opposing intuitions. But this powerful tool has not always
been equally accessible to the participants in the debate about
responsibility. On the contrary, it has traditionally been much easier
for compatibilists to use the power of the particular than it has
for incompatibilists.
3. Behavioral Science Particulars and the Originationist Intuition
Against this backdrop, the real significance of the behavioral
science challenge can emerge. The power of that challenge does not
lie in the way the behavioral sciences suggest that determinism is
true, but in the way that the behavioral sciences bring determinism
to life. Offering an ever-growing library of material to integrate into
concrete, detailed descriptions of the causes of human acts, the
behavioral sciences help incompatibilists narrow the particularlism
gap with compatibilists.
115. See, e.g., Pereboom, Determinism al Dente, supra note 41, at 246-47 (offering hypotheticals in which “Mr. Green is like an ordinary human being, except that he was
created by neuroscientists . . .”).
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To illustrate, I offer three examples from scholarship grappling
with wrongdoing and responsibility. In each case, the theorist raises
doubts about responsibility for wrongdoing and relies to a substantial
degree on the behavioral sciences. In all three cases, the standard
rebuttal is that the science cited does not establish determinism, and
that even if it does, responsibility can be salvaged by making the
compatibilist move. As I hope to highlight, however, rebuttals along
these traditional lines miss the real strength of these theorists’
arguments, which does not lie in the intimations of determinism, but
in the particularistic stories the theorists tell along the way. Each of
these theorists makes extensive use of the behavioral sciences to
flesh out particularized stories about caused human action, and in
each case this revitalizes our originationist intuitions and (thus) our
incompatibilist sense that there is something wrong with attributing
responsibility to wrongdoers in a determined world.
(a) Hospers’ Freudian Stories
Consider, first, how philosopher John Hospers used Freudian
ideas to challenge attributions of responsibility in the middle of the
last century. Hospers was especially interested in Freud’s theories
about “unconscious motivation,”116 from which Hospers took the view
that “the unconscious is the master of every fate and the captain of
every soul.”117 As he explained, “[t]he conscious life of the human
being, including the conscious decisions and volitions, is merely a
mouthpiece for the unconscious”;118 “our very acts of volition, and the
entire train of deliberations leading up to them, are but facades for
the expression of unconscious . . . compromises and defenses.”119 Per
Freud, these compromises and defenses could, in turn, be traced to
“unconscious conflicts developed in infancy”120 and to tensions
between the id, ego, and superego:
There is a Big Three behind the scenes which the automaton called
the conscious personality carries out: the id, an “eternal gimmie,”
presents its wish and demands . . . satisfaction; the superego says
no to the wish immediately upon presentation, and the
unconscious ego, the mediator between the two, tries to keep peace
by means of compromise.121

116. Hospers, Freedom, supra note 12, at 26; see also Hospers, Psychoanalysis, supra
note 12, at 465.
117. Hospers, Psychoanalysis, supra note 12, at 471.
118. Id. at 465.
119. Id. at 466.
120. Hospers, Freedom, supra note 12, at 26.
121. Hospers, Psychoanalysis, supra note 12, at 465.
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These psychic dynamics, he said, were the true “genesis of criminal
actions.”122 “[W]ithout their own knowledge” many criminal offenders
act out “fantasies, fears, and defenses from early childhood, over whose
coming and going they have no conscious control.”123 In many cases,
their crimes, which may seem deliberate and carefully planned, are
actually driven by “overwhelming impulse[s] . . . stemming from an
unusually humiliating ego defeat in early childhood.”124
Hospers contended that this account of unconscious motivation
posed a threat to responsibility. To his eyes, Freud’s theories
suggested that each person’s actions “grow out of his character,
which is shaped and molded and made what it is by influences—some
hereditary, but most of them stemming from early parental
environment—that were not of his own making or choosing.”125 Many
wrongdoers, he said, “are passive, not active—they are victims of a
neurotic conflict.”126 And if this is right, he asked, “How can anyone
be responsible for his actions . . . ?”127
Critics have read Hospers to be making the traditional
determinist argument against responsibility. To their eyes, his
argument is that Freudian theory helps show that human acts are
determined, and that human actors are therefore not responsible for
their acts. Having interpreted Hospers’ project this way, the critics
then refute him on both fronts. Characterizing Freudian theory as
dubious and Hospers’ use of that theory as naive, they argue that
Hospers has given us no good reason to believe determinism is true.
In addition, they make the compatibilist move, arguing that even if
determinism is true, we can be responsible for determined acts, and
that nothing in Hospers’ account of unconscious motivations actually
strips us of the features we must have to be responsible actors. Even
if we are driven by such motivations, we can still engage in practical
reasoning, recognize reasons for and against what we do, and so on.128
Such arguments, however, ignore an important dimension of
Hospers’ project. While Hospers was impressed with Freud, he did
not mean to use Freud to prove determinism.129 Instead, Freudianism
was just the starter for an imaginative exploration of the causes of
wrongful acts. Consider, for example, how Hospers used Freudian
ideas in two accounts of human wrongdoing. In the first, he discusses
a hypothetical murderer:
122. Hospers, Freedom, supra note 12, at 27.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 29.
125. Id. at 32.
126. Hospers, Psychoanalysis, supra note 12 at 470.
127. Hospers, Freedom, supra note 12, at 32.
128. See, e.g., Moore, Causation, supra note 62, at 1130-31 (making compatibilist move
in critique of Hospers).
129. Id. at 41 (“I want to make it quite clear that I have not been arguing for determinism.”).
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Let us take as an example a criminal [who commits several
murders] . . . . [N]ow we find out how it all came about; we learn of
parents who rejected him from babyhood, of the childhood spent in
one foster home after another, where it was always plain to him
that he was not wanted; of the constantly frustrated early desire
for affection, the hard shell of nonchalance and bitterness that he
assumed to cover the painful and humiliating fact of being
unwanted, and his subsequent attempts to heal these wounds to
his shattered ego through defensive aggression. . . . “The criminal .
. . tr[ies] to wreak revenge on the mother of the earliest period of
his babyhood; his criminality is based on the inner feeling of being
incapable of making the mother even feel that the child seeks
revenge on her. . . . [T]he primary inner aim of forcing the giant to
acknowledge the dwarf’s fury is fulfilled.”130

In the second account, Hospers reports about a (not hypothetical)
boy “sentenced to prison for the murder of a girl.”131 He recounts that
the boy’s “parental background includes records of drunkenness,
divorce, social maladjustment, [and] paresis,” and that “[t]he boy [at
an early age] displayed a tendency toward sadistic activity to hide an
underlying masochism and to ‘prove that he’s a man’; being coddled
by his mother only worsens this tendency, until, spurned by a girl in
his attempt on her, he kills her . . . .”132
In each of these cases, Hospers has framed the discussion by
invoking the Freudian unconscious, but it should be clear that the
story he tells is only partly and loosely a Freudian story. There are
references to shattered ego, buried childhood conflict, and neurosis;
but there are also references to ideas more likely to be found in the
sociology and ethnography of crime—poor and absent parenting,
loneliness and rejection, and pent-up frustration vented in violence.
Indeed, Hospers’ own discussion acknowledges that the Freudian
details in his account might best be thought of as imaginative standins for whatever is really at work: he ruminates that there “may . . .
be . . . some combination of factors” that leads to murder, factors still
to be “discovered.”133 The Freudian elements of his story, then, are
but part of a bigger project.
A central piece of that bigger project involves bringing determined
action to life so that we will engage it in a deep and searching way.
Hospers offers his Freudian accounts not as facts, but as
illustrations—stand-ins or representations of better causal
explanations we may someday have. Their value, then, does not lie in
their ability to prove that determinism is true; rather, it lies in the

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 33 (quoting EDMUND BERGLER, THE BASIC NEUROSIS 305 (1949).
Hospers, Psychoanalysis, supra note 12, at 465.
Id.
Hospers, Freedom, supra note 12, at 34.
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way they induce us to imagine and engage with the causes of
determined action. His Freudian accounts role model particularistic
explanation. They show us how we might look back through time to
connect formative events to wrongful acts and alert us that the
connections can be conceived in concrete, mechanical ways. In so
doing, they prove Hospers’ more fundamental point: “[T]he more
thoroughly and in detail we know the causal factors . . . , the more we
tend to exempt [the wrongdoer] from responsibility.”134
Once we see that Hospers is less concerned with the Freudian
proof of determinism than he is with the power of the particularism
that Freudianism role models, we can see that Hospers uses
Freudian causal explanations to much the same effect that Watson
used his killer’s personal history. For example, as Watson did,
Hospers uses detailed claims about the offenders’ formative
experiences to bring us back to childhood, highlighting for us the
ways in which the offenders were once vulnerable and sympathetic
figures. This, in turn, encourages us to see the wrongdoers as
malleable (at the mercy of formative forces beyond their control) and
as victims (of wretched parenting, ego defeat, and an unfortunate
confluence of uninvited circumstances), so that we empathize with
them and feel compassion toward them. In a similar vein, by
cataloging a set of distinctive formative forces in the criminal’s life,
Hospers (like Watson) enables us to imagine what the wrongdoer
might have been like without those formative influences—to see that
removing those perverting forces might leave a “normal” person. In
so doing, his examples invite us to identify with the wrongdoer, and
thus to give up feelings of difference and “moral superiority”135 that
fuel blame. At the same time, Hospers’ Freudian stories also tap into
the fairness concerns that Watson uncovered. For example, Freud’s
emphasis on the parental role in the formation of unconscious
conflicts makes us wonder if blaming the offender is blaming the
wrong person—perhaps his parents should be blamed instead?136
Likewise, seeing the various powerful forces involved in shaping the
psyche, we worry that plucking the wrongful actor out of the causal
web is essentially arbitrary. And seeing how much variability there is
in the formative experiences people encounter, we are sensitized to
the extraordinary role that luck plays in who does wrong: “Someone
commits a crime and is punished by the state; ‘he deserved it,’ we say
. . . as if we were moral and he immoral, when in fact we are lucky
134. Id. at 35.
135. Id. at 34.
136. Hospers saw that we might have this impulse (to shift the focus of blame from
wrongdoer to parent) and warned that resting blame on the parent would be equally misguided (for the reason that the parent, too, is the product of forces and circumstances he
cannot control). Id. at 36.
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and he is unlucky—forgetting that there, but for the grace of God and
a fortunate early environment, go we.”137
If there is power in Hospers’ Freudian stories, then, it is the same
power that Watson uncovered in his seminal essay. It does not depend
upon the truth of Freud’s particular claims, but on the insights that
emerge from the process of imagining the particular causes of wrongful
acts. Hospers’ Freudian stories pull us into determinism and induce us
to imagine what it means to be determined. In so doing, they activate
deep fairness concerns and powerful empathic attitudes—concerns and
attitudes that amplify our originationist intuitions and put significant
pressure on blaming intuitions.
Hospers is not, then, arguing that the route from Freud to
determinism to the end of responsibility is a simple one, like a
subway ride from one stop to another. Rather, he weaves Freud’s
ideas into his argument as threads in a diverse tapestry; bits of
causal detail that work with other causal details to fill out a vision of
what it means to be a determined actor. He is capitalizing on their
granularity, recognizing that when we imagine and engage discrete
details about determined acts, we shift from the bird’s-eye view of
those acts to the view on the ground. Now we empathize and identify
with the determined actor. Now we feel sympathy and compassion.
Now it seems unfair that so much depends on luck. Now it seems
perverse to treat the actor as though he were a freestanding monad
rather than the intersection of countless causal chains. As we
imagine the causes of determined wrongdoing particularistically, the
concerns that drive the originationist intuition come to life,
amplifying the originationist intuition and putting new pressure on
our initial inclination to blame the wrongdoer.
In this light, critiquing Hospers for his reliance on or
misunderstanding of Freud misses the most powerful feature of
Hospers’ work. While Hospers’ thesis is that insights from Freudian
theory suggest that we are not responsible actors, his argument does
not rest primarily on the premises that Freudian theory proves
determinism or that this alone threatens responsibility. Rather, he
uses Freudian theory to model particularistic visions of caused
human action, showing how those detail-infused accounts bring
137. Id. at 41. Or, as he puts it, while talking about why some people can overcome the
urge to be a spendthrift, “[S]ome people do. They are lucky. They have it in them to overcome early deficiencies by exerting great effort . . . . Some of us, luckier still, can overcome
them with but little effort; and a few, the luckiest, haven’t the deficiencies to overcome. It’s
all a matter of luck.” Id. at 39. Likewise, “[w]hat about the children who turn out ‘all right’?
All we can say is that ‘it’s just lucky for them’ that what happened to their unfortunate
brother didn’t happen to them . . . The machine turned them out with a minimum of damage. . . Some of us are lucky enough not to have a gambling-neurosis or criminotic tendencies or masochistic mother-attachment or overdimensional repetition-compulsion to make
our lives miserable . . . .” Hospers, Psychoanalysis, supra note 12, at 471-72.
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determinism to life, recharge the originationist intuition, and thereby
undermine traditional accounts of responsibility.
(b) Stories About Toxic Social Conditions
Freudian stories are relatively rare in criminal theory today, but
stories drawing on other behavioral sciences are more common.
Perhaps the most common are stories grounded in the sociology and
psychology of toxic social conditions.138 Theorists presenting these
stories typically recount findings in sociology and psychology that
suggest strong connections between toxic social conditions like poverty,
socioeconomic inequality, and racism and important social problems
like crime, violence, and wrongdoing. Given these findings, the theorist
suggests, we ought to reconsider who we hold responsible.
Consider, in this regard, Patricia Falk’s discussion of “social
toxins.”139 Falk proposes that the law should more fully credit certain
sorts of criminal defenses—namely, defenses grounded in the
defendant’s exposure to social toxins like violent environment (“reallife violence”),140 media violence, and racism.141 In support of this
view, she describes social science research regarding the “effects of
real-life violence” on children who witness that violence.142 She
explains as follows:
Firsthand exposure to violence may result in full-blown
psychiatric disorders. The most common [being] . . . PostTraumatic Stress Disorder. . . .143
....
. . . [A] number of other psychiatric disorders may also
result. . . .144
....
In addition . . . exposure to real-life violence can lead to . . .
emotional problems such as depression and anxiety; cognitive and
developmental impairment . . . and behavioral outcomes including
suicide and violence directed toward others.145
. . . [T]he effects of violence on children may be especially
deleterious. . . . [and] may arrest or impair developmental
processes with long-term consequences. . . .146
138. The seminal example in legal academic literature is Delgado, supra note 6.
139. Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based upon the Toxicity of the
Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 N.C.L.
REV. 731, 731 (1996).
140. Id. at 758.
141. Id. at 758. Falk describes community violence, violence in media, and racism as
among the “most pervasive and damaging” social toxins. Id. at 735.
142. Id. at 758.
143. Id. at 759.
144. Id. at 761.
145. Id. at 762 (footnotes omitted).
146. Id. at 762-63.
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. . . [T]he phenomenon of chronic violence may be more
psychologically devastating than discrete episodes . . . [and may
lead to] “alterations of personality, and major changes in patterns
of behavior or articulations of ideological interpretations of the
world that provide a framework for making sense of ongoing
danger . . . .”147
“ . . . Being abused as a child may increase one’s risk for
becoming an abusive parent, a delinquent, or an adult violent
criminal. . . .”148
One possible causal explanation for violent behavior on the part
of those exposed to violence is social learning theory, which
suggests that children learn or model the behavior that they
observe. A second explanation is a variant of the frustrationaggression hypothesis. Frustration when combined with highly
salient aggression cues may result in violence.149

Building on this summary of the relevant social science, Falk
suggests that novel “defense theories [including] urban psychosis . . .
may be accommodated within existing categories of criminal defense
and mitigation.”150 To her eyes, then, these social science findings
diminish responsibility in some cases of wrongdoing.
One reading of Falk’s social science argument pigeonholes it as a
traditional deterministic argument in which Falk maintains that the
social sciences prove determinism and that this calls responsibility
into question. After all, Falk sometimes implies that the social
sciences provide causal explanations for wrongful acts: “exposure to
real-life violence can lead to [certain] behavioral outcomes . . . “151;
parental abuse “increase[s] one’s risk . . .” for criminal conduct152;
“social learning theory . . . [and the] . . . “frustration-aggression
hypothesis”153 provide “causal explanation[s] for violent behavior on
the part of those exposed to violence . . . .”154 Perhaps this attention to
causation suggests she is using the social sciences to paint a
deterministic picture of criminal conduct.
But this reading of Falk’s argument mistakes the trees for the
forest. In fact, Falk is not much interested in using the social sciences
to prove that determinism is true. Indeed, she acknowledges that
“[t]he empirical and theoretical . . . support” for the various social

147. Id. at 763 (quoting James Garbarino et al., What Children Can Tell Us About Living in Danger, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 376, 377 (1991)).
148. Id. at 763-64 (quoting Cathy Spatz Widom, Does Violence Beget Violence?: A Critical Examination of Literature, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 24 (1989)).
149. Id. at 764 (footnotes omitted).
150. Id. at 801.
151. Id. at 762.
152. Id. at 763-64.
153. Id. at 764 (footnote omitted).
154. Id.
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toxin defenses is uncertain and “varies to some degree”155 She has a
different object in mind. As in Watson and Hospers, an important
current in Falk’s discussion involves imagining and articulating
particularistic causal explanations of bad acts. To this end, she lays
out in moderate detail several reasons why childhood exposure to
violence might lead to violent acts as an adult: it can cause serious
mental illness, depression, and anxiety; it can cause emotional and
cognitive impairment; it can lead to “alterations of personality . . .
and . . . ideological interpretations of the world that provide a
framework” through which the actor interprets his circumstances; it
models and teaches violent behavior; it catalyzes frustration; and it
inculcates pathways from frustration to violence.156 In sketching this
array of causal mechanisms, she hopes to “transcend generalized
theories”157 of social influence, to describe “sophisticated causal
explanations”158 of the sort that can “provide more . . . specific
articulations of the impact of discrete social toxins on . . .
criminality.”159 In short, she strives to carve a passage from passive,
airy abstractions like “a hard childhood causes crime” to an engaged,
particularistic vision of why this might be so.
The value of this project lies less in the accuracy of its various
claims than in what it shows us about how particularistic
explanations of wrongdoing influence our moral intuitions. As
Watson and Hospers did, Falk puts us in touch with the concerns and
attitudes that drive the originationist intuition. As they did, Falk
shows how the causes of present wrongful acts might be traced back
to the wrongdoer’s childhood. As they did, she highlights for us the
ways in which present offenders were once vulnerable and malleable
themselves, encouraging us to see wrongdoers as victims—exposed to
brutality against their will, damaged psychologically and
developmentally, and transformed into something they would not
otherwise have been. As in Watson and Hospers, this fuels feelings of
sympathy, empathy, and compassion toward such wrongdoers. In the
same vein, Falk’s catalog of toxic social phenomena puts us in
position to imagine how, without those perverting forces, a
wrongdoer might have turned out “normal” and familiar, like “us.”
This, in turn, makes us more likely to identify with the wrongdoer, to
stand in his shoes, to scrutinize social blaming practices with the
critical eye of the blamed. Now we are more likely to worry about the
fairness of blaming offenders for acts traceable back to the adults
155. Id. at 781. Falk suggests that the social science evidence regarding exposure to
“real-life violence” is the strongest. Id.
156. Id. at 763.
157. Id. at 736.
158. Id. at 806.
159. Id. at 736.
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who abused them when they were children.160 Now we are more likely
to worry that plucking the wrongful actor out of this teeming web of
causes is essentially arbitrary—why focus on him, when his act is so
much the product of everything else? Now we are reminded of the
central role that luck plays here, given how little control children
have over their exposure to social toxins, and wonder if it is fair to
blame violent actors when the cycle of violence is such a lottery.
Thus, imagining the causes of wrongdoing particularistically, we can
explore determinism in a new and deeper way than we had before.
And as we do so, we discover aspects of caused wrongdoing that
amplify the originationist intuition, putting new pressure on our
initial inclination to blame the wrongdoer.
Falk’s analysis, then, taps the same power source that Watson
and Hospers tap. She uses social science evidence to pull us into a
particularistic imagining of caused wrongful conduct. Full of
engrossing detail, her account engages us in a way abstractions
cannot. In so doing, it amplifies our originationist intuitions about
responsibility, and thus shows how incompatibilists can recapture
the power of the particular.
(c) Stories from Situationist Psychology
In recent years, responsibility theorists have also returned to
individual psychology—not the Freudian sort that Hospers embraced,
but several strands of contemporary empirical psychology, including
social cognition, cognitive psychology, and situationist psychology.
These lines of research have proven to be rich new sources for
particularistic causal explanations of wrongful acts.
Consider, for example, how philosopher John Doris uses the body
of research sometimes described as situationist psychology.161 As
Doris explains, situationist psychology encompasses a diverse array
of experiments that, taken together, show that contingent and
prosaic situational variables influence human conduct to a far
greater extent than we generally realize162: “seemingly insubstantial
160. Hospers, Freedom, supra note 12, at 35-36.
161. See DORIS, supra note 8, at 28-29.
162. See generally DORIS, supra note 8; see also Kaye, Situationist Psychology, supra
note 8. For an influential overview of situationism, see generally ROSS & NISBETT, supra
note 15. For other thorough introductions to the empirical psychology supporting situationism, see SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION (McGraw-Hill, Inc. 2d
ed., 1991) (1984); ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE (1999);
DOUGLAS L. MEDIN, BRIAN H. ROSS & ARTHUR B. MARKMAN, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
(Ryan Flahive ed., 4th ed. 2005); GORDON B. MOSCOWITZ, SOCIAL COGNITION:
UNDERSTANDING SELF AND OTHERS (Abraham Tesser ed., The Guilford Press 1999). David
Hanson and John Yosifon also provide a thorough survey while discussing some of situationism’s ramifications for legal theory. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational
Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1 (2004); Jon
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Crit-
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situational factors have substantial effects on what people do.”163 He
grounds his discussion in an extended series of concrete examples
drawn from the situationist literature:
x

x

x

x

x

x

Finding an abandoned dime in a payphone makes us more likely
to lend a stranger a helping hand: “[i]f greedy Jeff finds the dime,
he’ll likely help, and if compassionate Nina doesn’t, she very
likely won’t.”164
The smell of coffee makes us more likely to help a person in need:
“subjects near a fragrant bakery or coffee shop [are] more likely
to change a dollar bill when asked than those near a neutralsmelling dry goods store.”165
The sound of a lawnmower suppresses our helping behavior: one
study “found passersby markedly less likely to help someone
retrieve dropped books if a lawnmower was running loudly
nearby.”166
Placed in groups of two or three, we are less likely to help
imperiled strangers than if we were alone: “[s]eventy percent of
bystanders offered help when they waited alone, compared with
7 percent in the company of an unresponsive confederate.”167
Placed in groups of two or three, we are less likely to respond to
apparent emergencies than if we were alone. Sitting in a waiting
room filling with smoke, 75 percent of solitary subjects “reported
the smoke to experimenters within four minutes . . . [but] [i]n a
trial with three naive [sic] subjects per group, in only 38 percent
of groups did someone report the smoke . . . .”168
Told they are late for a meeting, seminary students hurry past
(or step directly over) prostrate, moaning men on the sidewalk,
though most would have helped had they been told they were

ical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003); see also
Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology’s Challenges to Legal Theory and
Practice, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 1081 (2003).
Some psychologists reject situationism. For one example, see John Sabini, Michael
Siepmann & Julia Stein, The Really Fundamental Attribution Error in Social Psychological
Research, 12 PSYCH. INQUIRY 1 (2001) (arguing that seminal situationist studies can be
reinterpreted to fit the traditional dispositionist model, positing that dispositional tendency to avoid embarrassment or save face explains seminal studies better than situationism).
163. DORIS, supra note 8, at 28.
164. Id. at 30 (citing A. M. Isen & P. F. Levin, Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and Kindness, 21 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 384, 387-88 (1972)).
165. Id. at 31 (citing R. A. Baron, The Sweet Smell of . . . Helping: Effects of Pleasant
Ambient Fragrance on Prosocial Behavior in Shopping Malls, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 498, 500-01 (1997)).
166. Id. at 181 n. 8 (citing K. E. Mathews & L. K. Cannon, Environmental Noise Levels
as a Determinant of Helping Behavior, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 571, 574-75
[1975]).
167. Id. at 32-33 (citing B. Latané & J. Rodin, A Lady in Distress: Inhibiting Effects of
Friends and Strangers on Bystander Intervention, 5 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
189, 197 (1969)).
168. Id. at 32 (citing BIBB LATANÉ & JOHN M. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER:
WHY DOESN’T HE HELP? (1970)).
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early: “[t]he thought of being a few minutes late was enough to
make subjects not notice or disregard a person’s suffering.”169
A calmly stated order from a laboratory researcher can induce
most of us to inflict what we believe to be torturous and even
fatal shocks on a stranger: in Stanley Milgram’s famous
experiment, “the majority of subjects were willing to torture
another individual to what seemed the door of death without any
more direct pressure than the polite insistence of the
experimenter.”170
Given the role of “prison guard” in a mock prison, measurably
“normal” subjects quickly take to abusing and torturing peers
given “prisoner” roles: in Philip Zimbardo’s notorious experiment,
placement in the mock prison resulted in “a precipitous descent
into barbarism.”171

As Doris explains, situationist psychology takes these findings (and
numerous others) to converge upon the central point that seemingly
inconsequential situational variations have a dramatic impact on
what we do, one that can swamp the influence of our own character
traits and dispositions.172 That is, more than we realize, we do what
we do because we are steered toward doing so by subtle phenomena
in our situations rather than because we are “the kinds of people”
who do those things.
For Doris, this poses new challenges for conventional accounts of
responsibility.173 As he is careful to explain, however, the challenges
do not lie in situationism’s generic implications of determinism174:
“The worry, let me emphasize . . . is not simply that situationism
tells a causal story about the origins of behavior” or that
“psychological states are caused.”175 Rather, the problem lies in what
situationism tells us about “how they are caused.”176 In particular,
Doris takes situationist research to raise the possibility that
“situational factors are pervasively implicated in substantial
cognitive and motivational failures,”177 such that “exculpating
169. Id. at 34 (citing John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, From Jerusalem to Jericho: A
Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 100, 107 (1973)).
170. Id. at 42 (citing STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY 97-99 (1974)).
171. Id. at 52-53 (citing Craig Haney, Curtis Banks, & Philip. Zimbardo, Interpersonal
Dynamics of a Simulated Prison, 1 INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69, 88 (1973)).
172. See, e.g., id. at 53.
173. Id. at 128-53. Doris eventually concludes that sensitivity to situationism can contribute to individual development of features conducive to responsibility. Id. at 129. As I
have suggested elsewhere, however, it is not clear that this flows from the bulk of his discussion, which seems to raise problems for responsibility that his own solution does not resolve. See Kaye, Situationist Psychology, supra note 8 at 667.
174. Id. at 132-33 (stating that situationism “tells a disconcerting story about the way
some behaviors are caused,” but it does not threaten the libertarian belief in true free will).
175. Id. at 136.
176. Id.
177. Id at 134.
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impairments in the powers of reflective self-control” may be “more
the rule than the exception.”178 In many of the experiments described
above, for example, subjects did the “wrong” thing—shocked another
human being, abused a mock “inmate”—while struggling with the
feeling that they should not do it.179 Perhaps this suggests that people
do not generally have the powers of self-control necessary for
responsibility.180 And in many of these experiments, the subject’s
capacity for “instrumental” and moral reasoning seems to have been
impaired due to situational influences.181 Perhaps this suggests that
we do not have the “normative competence”182 necessary for
responsibility as often as we assume.183 The primary focus of Doris’s
discussion, then, is on the ways in which situationist findings seem to
suggest we lack certain features arguably essential to morally
responsible agents.
Along the way, however, Doris’s discussion also suggests a second
layer of problems for responsibility. Working through his survey of
situationist findings, following him as he imaginatively explores
“how” our conduct is caused, we find that Doris’s discussion has the
power to activate the same originationist intuitions that Watson,
Hospers, and Falk184 tap into. Like them, Doris describes
mechanisms driving human acts in close and colorful detail,
cataloging several discrete and peculiar situational phenomena that
178. Id. at 134.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 136. His eventual conclusion is more moderate: situationist psychology, he
says, “suggests that unobtrusive high-intensity stimuli very often obtain, with the result
that people may sometimes be in undetected excusing conditions.” Id.
181. Id. at 137. One example is found in Darley and Batson’s “Good Samaritan” experiment, discussed supra note 168.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 138.
184. There are some interesting differences in the character of the research summarized. For example, Doris’s summary focuses more on experimental results rather than
theorizing about the mechanisms that drive the results. In this sense, it has a different
texture than the psychoanalytic theory Hospers described (from which he derived explicit
claims about causal mechanisms) or the social science research Falk described (in which
most findings are closely associated with theorized explanations). As a result, his summary
makes fewer explicit claims about the causal mechanisms involved in human conduct.
Nevertheless, as the discussion in the text suggests, Doris’s summary has much the
same impact. Though he rarely makes claims about causal mechanisms, one of the most intoxicating features of the research described is the way it seems to unveil unexpected connections between situational phenomena and human conduct. The immediate interactions
between dimes and helping behavior, authoritative instruction and shock infliction, are at
least as suggestive of hidden determinants of human action as sociological findings about
the cycle of violence or the psychoanalyst’s observation that early childhood conflicts play
out in adult behavior. That is, while Doris’s summary of situationist research does not emphasize claims about causation, the summary nevertheless offers a great deal of material
that can easily be integrated into imaginative reconstructions of the causes of human acts.
Elsewhere, I have discussed in more detail some of the ways the situationist literature activates moral intuitions at odds with responsibility. See generally Kaye, Situationist Psychology, supra note 8.
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tug human actors into one sort of action or another. Not surprisingly,
his vividly detailed discussion stirs up many of the concerns and
attitudes associated with the originationist intuition. Seeing the
bizarre way abandoned dimes, coffee aromas, and mock prisons move
us exacerbates the worry that there is something misguided and
unfair about funneling our reactions to bad acts at the actor alone—
should we not direct our reactions to the puppet masters, not the
puppet? Seeing how contingent and arbitrary the influential
variables are, we are confronted again with the problems of moral
luck: if the reason you help a stranger in need but I do not is that you
are in the presence of fragrant coffee while I am in the presence of a
noisy lawn mower, the differences in our conduct do not seem to say
much about the differences between us. Resenting one of us but not
the other seems to make a lottery of the moral sentiments.
The vivid detail in these stories also invites us to identify with the
unwittingly channeled actors in these stories. It is easy to summon
Baron’s coffee fragrance to mind, to put ourselves in the shoes of his
subject as she strolls the mall, and to imagine how her mood changes
as the aroma engulfs her. The meticulous description of Milgram’s
shock experiment transports us back to Milgram’s lab, where we too
are perplexed by the strange machinery around us, shaken by the
unexpected instructions we are given, and disoriented by the
authoritarian researcher’s polite implacability. Inevitably, we find
ourselves standing in the shoes of the subjects, feeling the invisible
puppet strings of the situation, and understanding we would likely
have reacted the same way. Now we experience “being caused” in a
more imaginative and more personal way, from the inside out. Now
we engage determinism more deeply. Now the originationist intuition
that the responsible agent should not be moved in these puppet-like
ways gains force.
Thus, the same dynamics are in play here that were in play in
Watson, Hospers, and Falk. Doris’s survey of situationism summons
the same concerns and attitudes. It evokes the originationist
intuition in the same way and thus puts pressure on the
compatibilist move and responsibility attribution in the same way.
To be fair, Doris himself ultimately contends that responsibility
can survive the challenge from situationist psychology. In reaching
this conclusion, however, Doris overlooks a hidden feature of his own
presentation. Early on, he excuses himself from the debate about
whether determinism itself threatens responsibility, in part (it
appears) because he does not think situationist psychology has much
to say about whether determinism is true. In so doing, however, he
conflates the question of whether situationism proves determinism
with the question of whether situationism changes our intuitions
about the significance of determinism for responsibility. In fact, while
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it is true that situationist psychology adds little to the debate about
whether determinism is true, that does not mean that situationist
psychology is irrelevant to the debate about responsibility for
determined acts. On the contrary, as I have suggested, situationist
psychology has much to offer in that latter debate. It encourages and
enables us to engage in a kind of reflective process that is otherwise
very difficult—one in which we imaginatively flesh out what it would
mean to be a determined actor, stand in the shoes of the determined
actor, and scrutinize responsibility for determined acts from the
determined person’s perspective. Doris appreciates that concrete
details influence moral intuitions—he is convinced “that thinking
productively about ethics requires thinking realistically about
humanity . . . [and that] . . . facts about human psychology should . . .
constrain ethical reflection”185—but he overlooks some of the ways
this plays out with situationism, determinism, and responsibility.
Doris’s analysis, then, taps the same power source that Watson,
Hospers, and Falk did. His survey of situationist psychology pulls us
into a particularistic imagining of determined conduct. Full of
startling detail, his account engages us in a way abstractions cannot.
In so doing, it amplifies our originationist intuitions about
responsibility and thus our doubts about the compatibilist move and
about attributing responsibility in a determined universe.
(d) The Common Dynamic: Using Behavioral Science Stories to
Narrow the Particularism Gap
These three examples each reflect a phenomenon that can be seen
throughout the behavioral science challenge to responsibility: the
behavioral sciences threaten responsibility, in part, by narrowing the
particularism gap between compatibilism and incompatibilism.
As we have seen, particulars have a powerful influence on the
process of moral reflection. And, as we have seen, compatibilists have
traditionally been better positioned to capitalize on the power of the
particular than incompatibilists—not because compatibilism is
somehow inherently “more particularistic” than incompatibilism, but
because, given the state of human knowledge and the limits on
human imagination, it has always been easier to give a
particularistic description of a single wrongful act itself than of the
causal processes resulting in that act. As a result, when theorists
consider whether determinism poses a threat to responsibility, the
determinism element of this question has often been presented at a
very high level of abstraction. We are asked to imagine that
everything is determined, or that “bad background” or “family abuse”
is involved. Our predictably pallid reactions to such abstractions are
185. DORIS, supra note 8, at 1.
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then juxtaposed against our much more personal and potent
reactions to vivid descriptions of particular wrongful acts. The
resultant particularism gap tilts the balance toward attributions of
responsibility. Deeply engaged with the wrongful act, unable to
connect with the story of its causes, we are drawn powerfully
to blame.
But, as the examples above suggest, findings in behavioral science
research can push us to revisit the determinism prong of the
question. As each example illustrates, the behavioral sciences provide
the material to flesh out and imaginatively reconstruct concrete,
detailed, and reasonably realistic causal accounts of wrongful acts. It
is not that they provide comprehensive and uncontroversially
accurate causal accounts–no one would say that Hospers’
Freudianism, Falk’s sociology, or Doris’s situationist psychology offer
complete explanations for wrongful acts, or that they are obviously
“right”—but their power does not depend on these things. Rather, the
power of these behavioral science stories lies in the way they role
model and invite serious efforts to imagine what it means to be a
determined actor. They articulate plausible links between some of
the most influential forces in human life (family, social conditions,
situational influences) and human wrongdoing, treating those links
as accessible and envisionable rather than unimaginable. And they
flesh out those links in vivid detail, giving them the kind of texture
and substance that catalyzes imaginative reflection. Thus, whether
or not the particular claims the behavioral scientists make are
always convincing, their stories whet our imaginative appetites.
Having tasted particularistic determinism, we are more likely to
keep thinking about determinism in particularistic ways. In this
sense, behavioral science stories like the ones Hospers, Falk, and
Doris tell invite us to change our moral perspective, to come down
from the airy clouds where determinism is assumed arguendo and
grapple with the nitty-gritty nuts and bolts of life in a determined
universe. In this sense, these descriptions really do bring
determinism “to life.”
And, as we have seen, this shift to a more life-like conception of
determined wrongdoing tends to evoke much more potent
incompatibilist reactions than the traditional highly abstract version
does. The life-like conception induces us to engage the causes of
wrongdoing emotionally and intellectually, to hold them in our
imaginations, and to reflect upon them in ways that allow them to
make associative connections with our feelings, values, and lives. It
speaks to our moral intuitions in ways that abstractions cannot,
affecting them in powerful and important ways. We identify,
empathize, and feel compassion. Standing in new shoes, we worry in
new ways about moral luck, moral tunnel vision, and fairness. All the
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various tributaries that feed into the originationist intuition are
opened up, and the intuition comes flooding back into our moral
reflections. This is the secret heart of a phenomenon that
compatibilist legal scholars so often concede—the more we explain a
person’s act the more we are inclined to excuse it.
This, then, is where the real power of the behavioral science
challenge to responsibility lies. The behavioral sciences provide a
slowly growing tool kit for construction of credible particularistic
descriptions of the causal machinery behind wrongdoings. The result
is that we are slowly acquiring the resources to create credible
particularistic causal explanations of human acts; and engaging
these particularistic explanations, it turns out, revitalizes the
originationist intuition. In this way, the behavioral sciences give
incompatibilists the material they need to construct descriptions of
the causes of wrongdoing that will engage us and our moral
intuitions as deeply as the crime stories compatibilists have always
found so easy to tell.
Of course, it is likely that many readers, having read through the
samples above, remain inclined to compatibilism rather than
originationism. But the claim here is not that a handful of behavioral
science descriptions of the causes of human acts will instantly
transform a compatibilist into an originationist. Rather, the
argument is that the behavioral sciences pose a threat to
compatibilism not just for the somewhat pallid reason that they
suggest determinism, but for the much more potent reason that they
generate a steadily growing accumulation of particularistic accounts
of the causes of human acts, and such accounts have significantly
more power to bring originationist intuitions to life than abstract
portrayals of determinism do. Given our intuitions about free will
and responsibility, it is never easy to be a compatibilist; but it is
easier to be a compatibilist when determinism is imagined as a pure
abstraction than it is when we look directly at the causal machinery
implicated in particular human acts, as the behavioral sciences push
us to do.
IV. CONCLUSION
The struggle to understand responsibility and its preconditions is
an ancient one and will surely persist far into the future. But the
struggle has never been and should not be conceived as a static one.
On the contrary, the struggle has been and should continue to be
informed by developments in other areas of human inquiry. Once, for
example, theological concerns played a central role in the debates
about free will and responsibility; but as theology, physical science,
and moral theory diverged, theological considerations moved from
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the center of the debate to the margins. At the same time, advances
in the physical sciences over the last two centuries have pushed
concerns about physical determinism to the forefront of theorizing
about responsibility such that most academic philosophers now
consider physical determinism (or some equivalent) a foregone
conclusion—a view that might have shocked (some) responsibility
theorists from earlier ages. The ancient debate about freewill and
responsibility, then, is perpetually renewed by changes and advances
in our understanding of other areas of human inquiry.
In this Article, I have suggested that advances in the behavioral
sciences may have significant ramifications for responsibility
attribution. This may seem, at first glance, an obvious proposition.
After all, our theories of responsibility attribution obviously must be
grounded in explicit and implicit moral psychologies. In order to
attribute responsibility to a person, we must have some idea of how
that person works and acts, some working moral psychology that
explains how a person’s act can merit a moral response like praise or
blame. If so, new discoveries regarding the machinery of human
perception, cognition, desire, choice, and conduct may have
significant implications for responsibility attribution. If our empirical
discoveries are inconsistent with the posited moral psychology on
which we ground responsibility attribution, this naturally raises
urgent questions about the propriety of responsibility attribution
going forward. At the very least, we must determine whether the
discovered psychology is as supportive of responsibility attribution as
the previously posited one.
Though this proposition may seem obvious, criminal theory does
not always embrace it. As Part II recounted, criminal theorists
sometimes fend off suggestions that the behavioral sciences might
threaten responsibility by fiat, bluntly declaring that the criminal
law cannot or should not accommodate behavioral science evidence
that human behavior is caused or determined. A more engaged
response takes up arguments from the compatibilist tradition. This is
an influential and sophisticated philosophical position, and criminal
theorists have generally been satisfied that compatibilism is
sufficient to defeat whatever threat the behavioral sciences pose to
responsibility attribution.
As I have argued in this Article, however, it is far from clear that
compatibilism is an adequate defense against the challenge from the
behavioral sciences. Indeed, I have suggested, compatibilism does not
speak to the main thrust of that challenge at all. In philosophy,
compatibilism has been developed to show that responsibility is
viable in a determined universe, and many theorists believe that it is
successful in doing so. But, as I have argued, the behavioral sciences
threaten responsibility not so much because they suggest
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determinism is true, but because they describe determinism in a
particular way, a way that brings determinism to life. Providing us
with a steady supply of particularized accounts of caused human
conduct, the behavioral sciences induce us to shift from an abstract
conception of determinism to a particularistic conception of caused
human action. This particularistic conception engages our emotions
in a much deeper way than its abstract counterpart. It invites us
to experience and think about determinism in a much more personal
way and to connect determinism with potent and morally significant
feelings about ourselves, about others, and about our culture and
society. At the same time, it induces us to reflect on the role of
determinism in human acts in a more careful, concrete, and
textured way.
This, I have argued, significantly shifts our moral intuitions about
the significance of causation for moral responsibility. It dramatically
amplifies the already potent originationist intuition that is strongly
at odds with compatibilism. It highlights, especially, the problems of
moral luck and fairness that compatibilism generates. And it brings
out attitudes—like identification, empathy, and compassion—that
call compatibilism into question. In these ways, we see that “live”
determinism strikes us more deeply than theoretical determinism,
and that contemplating live determinism makes us far more likely to
see the behavioral science threat to responsibility as a real and
potent one.
This is not to say, of course, that the behavioral sciences make
compatibilism impossible or that responsibility attribution cannot
survive progress in the behavioral sciences. Rather, it is meant to
show that the traditional tactics for refuting the behavioral science
challenge to criminal responsibility have failed to engage the most
potent features of that challenge. Calibrated to defuse anxieties
about determinism understood in the abstract, they do not speak to
the kind of determinism the behavioral sciences offer us—one set out
in particularistic detail. If criminal theory is to fend off the challenge
from the behavioral sciences, then, it must turn its attention to the
real challenge from the behavioral sciences. It cannot rest on
compatibilism alone; it must also show how compatibilism can
survive the strange and vital story told by the behavioral sciences.
This is a project criminal theorists have not yet fully taken up.
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